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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
LUKE ZACHARY BAKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060218-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free 
zone, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i), (4) (West 
2004), and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8 (4), 58-37a-5 (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was defendant—one of four passengers in a car stopped for having no front 
plate—reasonably detained during the traffic stop and arrest of the driver? 
2(a). Did police have probable cause to search the three backseat passengers, 
including defendant, after a drug-detection dog alerted on the outside rear door 
handle? 
2(b). Alternatively, did police have reasonable suspicion to frisk the passengers 
for weapons, given that they recovered 13 knives from the occupants, including 
defendant? 
The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 
11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for 
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 
UT95,1fll , l03P.3d699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free 
zone, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (4) (West 
2004), possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(4), 58-37a-5 (West 2004). Rl. 
Motion to suppress denied. Defendant moved to suppress paraphernalia and 
methamphetamine seized pursuant to warrantless searches of his person. R41-36. Following 
2 
an evidentiary hearing on 9 February 2005, see Rl 50, the trial court denied the motion, ruling 
that the first warrantless search was justified by probable cause to believe that defendant 
possessed drugs, and by reasonable suspicion that he may be armed and dangerous. R74-68. 
Conditional guilty plea. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to both charges 
on 4 January 2006, preserving his right to appeal the trial court's adverse ruling. Rl 12-105, 
116-113. 
Sentence. On 22 February 2006, the trial court imposed an indeterminate term of one 
to 15 years for the second degree felony, and a one year jail term for the class A 
misdemeanor. R120. The trial court then suspended both terms and imposed a 36-month 
probation term, including a 90-day jail term. Rl 19. 
Timely appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on 6 March 2006. R124. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Defendant was one of four passengers detained incident to the traffic stop and arrest 
of the vehicle driver. After police recovered 13 knives from the driver and passengers, 
including defendant, defendant and the other passengers were subj ected to a frisk, which lead 
to the discovery of a drug pipe on defendant's person. R149:6-8; Rl 50:24,27. Subsequent 
!The facts are adduced from the preliminary hearing held on 24 November 2004, 
see R149 (a copy is included in addendum A), and the suppression hearing held on 9 
February 2005, see R150 (A copy is included in addendum B). The facts are also recited 
in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to 
suppress. State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
3 
searches of defendant's person revealed methamphetamine and additional paraphernalia. Id.; 
see also Rl 50:28. 
In the early morning hours of 30 September 2004, Officer Robertson of the Pleasant 
Grove Police Department stopped a vehicle for having "no plate light." R149:5. As he 
approached the vehicle, Officer Robertson "observed five occupants, including defendant, 
who was one of three backseat passengers. Rl 50:25-26. The officer "used a flashlight to 
survey the back passengers before [he] approached the driver." Id. at 25. He saw a large 
sheathed knife "on one of the rear passengers." Id. at 26; see also R149:13 ("It was in plain 
view in a leather sheath, fairly large knife"). After conversing with the driver and obtaining 
her license, Officer Robertson returned to his patrol vehicle to run a computer check, which 
check revealed that the driver's license had been "[sjuspended for drugs." R149:5; Rl 50:25; 
see also R149:11. Simultaneously with learning that the driver's license was suspended for 
drugs, Officer Robertson requested a K-9 unit, at approximately 1:21 a.m. R149:ll, 18. 
While waiting for the K-9 unit to arrive, Officer Robertson arrested the driver, and 
alerted a backup officer, Officer Bartell, that "there were knives in plain view." R149:14; see 
also id. at 6, and Rl 50:26. One of the rear seat passengers also told Officer Bartell "that he 
had a knife." R150:9. Officer Bartell said, "well, I better take the knife until we finish[] up 
with the stop," and also asked "if there were anymore knives in the vehicle." Id. In response, 
"[ejveryone started handing [him] knives [E]verybody at least handed [him] one knife." 
Rl 50:9-10; see also id. at 11-12. Some were large pocket knives, with approximately five 
4 
to six inch blades. R150:12; see also id. at21. There was also a set of small throwing knives 
that were about three to four inches long. R150:12. Approximately 13 knives were 
recovered from the driver and passengers and set out on the hood of a patrol car. R149:13, 
21; see also Rl 50:16, 27. According to Officer Robertson, it was "rare" to find a knife 
during a traffic stop, let alone 13 knives. Rl 50:32. 
At 1:34 a.m., or approximately 13 minutes after it was requested, the K-9 unit arrived. 
R149:18. The K-9 unit included Officer Lopez and his police service dog. R150:5. Officer 
Lopez "made a safety check of the exterior of the vehicle," and then "deploy [ed his] police 
service dog." Id. at 6. The dog alerted twice on the vehicle: once "on the trunk of the vehicle 
on the driver's side," and once "on the driver's handle—the driver's rear passenger handle 
of the vehicle, the rear door." Id.; see also id. at 7. 
After the dog alerted, another backup officer, Officer Rockwood, removed the 
passengers from the vehicle and frisked them. Rl 50:15-16. In the course of frisking 
defendant, Officer Rockwood "found a bulge in his front [pants] pocket," and "asked 
[defendant] if [he] could retrieve it," and "what it was." Id. at 17. After defendant responded 
that the object was a pipe, Officer Rockwood "retrieved it out of his pocket." Id. at 18. 
Officer Rockwood observed that the pipe had been "used" for marijuana. Id. A further frisk 
of defendant's shoe yielded a second pipe. Id. Defendant was arrested and taken to the 
police station where Officer Robertson recovered a small baggy containing 71 grams of 
methamphetamine from defendant's person. R149:7-8. 
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Based on this evidence, the trial court entered a written ruling denying defendant's 
motion to suppress the paraphernalia and methamphetamine seized from his person.2 The 
trial court began its analysis by recognizing that police may reasonably require passengers 
to remain inside a vehicle during a traffic stop, and that "a canine sniff conducted during a 
[] lawful traffic stop . . . does not violate the Fourth Amendment." R73-72 (citing Maryland 
v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)). 
The trial court also entered factual findings regarding the traffic stop: 
• "[T]he . . . traffic stop . . . was initiated very early in the morning on 
September 30, 2004[.]" R72. 
"[T]he K-9 was requested at 1:21 a.m.," "the K-9 arrived at 1:34 a.m.," 
and "[defendant was searched and arrested at 1:45 a.m." Id? 
• "The request for the K-9 coincided with the discovery that the driver's 
license had been suspended for drugs." Id. 
2
 A copy of the trial court's ruling is attached in addendum C. 
3In his recitation of the facts, defendant asserts that Officer Robertson testified at 
the suppression hearing that he "requested the K-9 unit at 12:21 and that it arrived at 1:34 
a.m." (Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing Rl 50:26)). Defendant further asserts in a footnote, that 
Officer Robertson testified at the preliminary hearing "that the K-9 unit arrived at 12:34 
a.m." Aplt. Br. at 9 n.l (citing R149:12, 18). Although there is some confusion in the 
suppression hearing transcript, defendant's characterization of the officer's testimony is 
itself inaccurate. See Rl 50:26 (Officer Robertson: "I requested a K-9 at 021:00 hours. 
Orem told our dispatch they would respond at 022:00 hours and Officer Lopez arrived 
[with the dog] at 01:34 hours"). See also R149:12 (no testimony as to timing),18 (Officer 
Robertson testifies he requested the K-9 unit at "1:21 in the morning"). More 
importantly, however, defendant nowhere in his brief challenges as clearly erroneous, the 
trial court's findings regarding the length of the minutes long detention here at issue, or 
the timing of the request for, and arrival of, the K-9 unit. Defendant is thus bound by the 
trial court's findings. 
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• "Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the actual time 
length of the stop or in connection with the K-9 request[.]" Id. 
• "The K-9 arrived soon after the driver was placed under arrest in the 
police car[.] Id. 
• "[I]t was dark, extremely early in the morning, there were five 
occupants, two knives had already been found, and the officers were 
dealing with the driver and her arrest until the K-9 arrived." Id. 
• "[T]he officers never told the Defendant that he was not free to leave, 
although [the officer] testified that he subjectively believed that (which 
is irrelevant)." Id. 
Although the trial court recognized that detaining passengers was reasonable under 
Wilson, based on the above findings, the trial court ultimately concluded that no detention 
occurred here because police "never told [defendant that he was not free leave." R72 
(concluding defendant "was not 'detained' for purposes of Fourth Amendment protections 
to be triggered"). 
The trial court then entered findings regarding the frisk of defendant's person, finding 
that "the K-9 unit, which responded to the scene 13 minutes after it was called, alerted to the 
exterior of the vehicle that the Defendant was traveling in." Id.\ see also id. (finding that 
"Defendant has failed to challenge the canine's accuracy record"). From this finding, the 
trial court concluded that defendant was "properly searched incident to the probable cause 
derived from the positive canine alert." R71. 
Finally, the trial court made findings regarding an alternative—weapons 
frisk—justification for the search of defendant's person: 
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"When the police initially approached the vehicle, they noted that one 
of the occupants in the back seat was armed with a large knife." R70-
69. 
"[WJhen the driver was searched incident to arrest for driving on a 
suspended license, another knife was found on her." R69. 
"After the officers requested that the passengers turn over any other 
knives they had on them, a total of 13 knives were recovered, including 
at least one from the Defendant." Id. 
"Officer Mike Bartell, who retrieved the knives,... recovered about 12 
knives from the passengers, including a set of throwing knives." R70. 
"Officer Chris Lavar Rockwood, who arrived to assist Officer 
Raymond Robertson, conducted the Terry frisk of the Defendant." Id. 
"Before conducting the frisk, Officer Rockwood had observed 'quite 
a few,' cmore than five5 knives that had been taken from the vehicle 
and that they 'ranged [in size] from pocket knives to large knives.5 He 
also admitted that while there had been no overt threats from the 
passengers, he still had a concern for officer safety after observing the 
large number of knives.55 Id. 
"Officer Robertson testified that it was a rare case to retrieve 12-13 
knives from a vehicle.55 Id. 
"Officer Robertson... is always concerned about officer safety, though 
he personally had no fear at this scene for his own safety.'5 Id. 
"[T]he Court emphasizes that it was dark, around 1:30 a.m., and there 
were a total of five occupants in the vehicle.55 Id. 
"In sum, the Terry frisk of the Defendant did not occur until after: 
a. The driver had been placed under arrest, 
b. 12-13 knives had been retrieved from the passengers and 
driver, including some large knives, 
c. A police-trained drug-detection canine alerted to the 
trunk and the rear door of the vehicle. The Court also 
8 
notes that the Defendant was a passenger in the rear seat 
at the time." Id. 
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that "[t]he sheer number of knives 
alerted the officers that it was reasonable to conclude that there might be other weapons." 
Id, Accordingly, "it could not be much more clear that the officers reasonably believed that 
the Defendant and the other passengers were armed and dangerous." Id. "[Thus], the officers 
conducted a proper Terry frisk of the Defendant." R69. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. The trial court correctly recognized that police are justified in detaining 
passengers during a traffic stop of the driver. Thus, although the trial court ultimately ruled 
that defendant was not detained here because police never told him he was not free to leave, 
the trial court's ruling may be upheld on the clearly correct ground that any detention of the 
defendant and the other passengers here was justified until all the lawful objectives of the 
traffic stop were accomplished. Defendant asserts that the lawful objectives of the traffic 
stop were accomplished when police commenced to arrest the driver and therefore his 
detention after that point was unlawful. However, defendant was frisked before police had 
in fact accomplished all the lawful objectives of the traffic stop; in particular, they had not 
yet had a safe opportunity to search the passenger compartment of the driver's vehicle, a 
search they were entitled to make incident to her arrest. Therefore, defendant was reasonably 
detained incident to the traffic investigation at the time he was subjected to a weapons frisk 
of his person. 
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Point II. Although defendant was reasonably detained incident to the traffic stop, the 
frisk of his person required additional justification. The trial court ruled that the frisk was 
justified on two alternative and independent grounds. First, by probable cause derived from 
a drug-detection dog alert on the rear driver's side door handle, and second, by reasonable 
suspicion that defendant and the other passengers may be armed and dangerous. 
A. Significantly, defendant ignores the trial court's probable cause justification for 
the search and challenges only the reasonable suspicion justification for the frisk. Where a 
trial court's ruling is based on multiple independent grounds, an appellant may not obtain a 
reversal without challenging each ground. Accordingly, the instant ruling should be upheld 
on the unchallenged ground that police had probable cause to search defendant for drugs. 
B. Indeed, although a drug dog's generalized alert on a vehicle, without more, may 
not always justify warrantless searches of passengers, it did in this case because there is a 
nexus between the detected drugs and the backseat passengers. A nexus exists because the 
dog alerted on the rear exterior door handle, suggesting that the backseat passengers were 
involved, along with the driver—whose license was suspended for drugs—in current drug 
activity. The drugs also reasonably suggested that the occupants possessed the 13 knives 
police earlier retrieved for a nefarious rather than an innocent purpose. The trial court's 
ruling upholding the frisk on grounds of probable cause should therefore be upheld. 
C. Alternatively, the trial court's ruling may be upheld on the independent ground 
that police reasonably believed the passengers were armed and dangerous. As noted, police 
10 
recovered 13 knives from the vehicle occupants during the traffic stop; moreover, the three 
to four officers variously at the scene were outnumbered by the five vehicle occupants, the 
driver's license had been suspended for drugs, a drug-detection dog had alerted on the 
vehicle, it was late at night, and the area was very dark. Given the totality of these 
circumstances, the trial court reasonably ruled that the weapons frisk was justified, even 
though the passengers were cooperative and not overtly threatening to the officers. 
Moreover, given the obvious articulable safety concern created by the knives, the frisk was 
objectively reasonable even if one of the officers was primarily motivated to search for drugs. 
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should therefore be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT—A PASSENGER—WAS REASONABLY DETAINED 
INCIDENT TO THE TRAFFIC STOP AND ARREST OF THE DRIVER 
Defendant concedes the validity of the traffic stop ("no plate light") and arrest of the 
driver (driving while on suspension for drugs); thus, the only issues are whether police were 
justified in (1) detaining defendant—a passenger—incident to the traffic stop and arrest of 
the driver, and (2) subjecting him to a frisk of his person. See Aplt. Br. at 15 ("Baker does 
not dispute that the initial traffic stop was valid and that the driver was legally arrested"). The 
11 
validity of defendant's detention is addressed in the body of this point, and the validity of the 
frisk will be addressed in Point II, infra.4 
A. Under Maryland v. Wilson and progeny, police could 
reasonably detain defendant—a passenger—until the lawful 
objectives of the traffic stop were completed. 
Turning to the first issue, or the validity of defendant's detention, defendant asserts 
that he was "illegally detained" from the outset of the traffic stop, when the driver was placed 
under arrest, or "when Officer Robertson called for a K-9 unit and had [the passengers] wait 
until the K-9 unit arrived and searched the exterior of the vehicle." Aplt. Br. at 15; see also 
id. at 17. At the very least, defendant asserts that he was "illegally detained once his pocket 
knife was confiscated, well before the K-9 unit arrived and while he was still detained in the 
vehicle." Id. at 15; see also id. at 11, 19 (same). 
The trial court, on the other hand, recognized that police are justified in detaining 
passengers during traffic stops, see R73 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997)), 
but ultimately ruled that defendant "was not 'detained' for purposes of Fourth Amendment 
protections to be triggered" because "police "never told the [defendant that he was not free 
4Defendant asserts that suppression is required under both the state and federal 
constitutions, but he engages in no analysis of the state constitution. See Aplt. Br. at 24. 
His reliance on the state constitution is therefore nominal. See Brig ham City v. Stuart, 
2005 UT 13, 122 P.3d 506 ("W]e are resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional 
issues which have not been properly preserved, framed, and briefed"), rev'd on other 
grounds, 124 S.Ct. 1943 (2006). See also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247, n.5 
(Utah 1988) ("[W]e will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless an argument for 
different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed"). 
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to leave." R72. Because the trial court's initial recognition that police may lawfully detain 
passengers incident to a traffic stop is clearly correct, its ruling should be upheld on that 
ground. 
The "touchstone" of any Fourth Amendment inquiry is "the reasonableness in all the 
circumstances" of the law enforcement practice at issue. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 
411 (1997) (citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment authorizes an officer who observes 
a traffic offense committed by a vehicle driver to lawfully detain any vehicle passengers until 
the lawful objectives of the traffic stop are completed. In Wilson, a Maryland state trooper 
stopped a speeding car in which Wilson was a passenger. 519 U.S. at 410. While dealing 
with the driver, the trooper noticed that Wilson appeared extremely nervous and ordered him 
to get out of the car. Id. As Wilson exited his car, some cocaine fell to the ground. Id. at 
411. The state courts suppressed the evidence on the ground that it was illegal to ask a 
passenger to exit a stopped vehicle. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 414-15. It held that the rule of 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) —that a driver may be ordered to exit a 
lawfully stopped vehicle—should be extended to include passengers. See Wilson, 519 U.S. 
at 413-15; see also State v. Shephard, 955 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah App. 1998) (recognizing 
Wilson). The Supreme Court reasoned that "the same weighty interest in officer safety is 
present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger," and 
that the danger to law enforcement only "increases" when "there is more than one occupant 
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of the vehicle." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413. Moreover, the interest in officer safety is 
compelling, while "the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal" because, "as a 
practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle. The 
only change in their circumstances which will result from ordering them out of the car is that 
they will be outside of, rather than inside of, the stopped car." Id. at 413-415. Finally, the 
Supreme Court observed that Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), where police 
lawfully detained eight people in a house during the execution of a search warrant, "offers 
guidance by analogy, " and repeated the observation made in Summers, that "c[t]he risk of 
harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise 
unquestioned command of the situation.'" Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (quoting Summers, 452 
U.S. at 702-03). 
Since Wilson, neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has specifically 
addressed whether police may require passengers to remain inside the vehicle during a traffic 
stop of the driver. However, both courts recognize that Wilson authorizes police to order all 
occupants out of a vehicle "during the course of the investigation." State v. James, 2000 UT 
80, f^ 10, 13 P.3d 576 ("Owing to inherent safety concerns and the limited nature of the 
intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle to leave the vehicle during the course 
of the investigation"). See also State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, ffi[ 17-18, 68 P.3d 1052 
(quoting Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03), in a non-traffic 
stop case and recognizing, in dicta, that "under certain circumstances officers may detain a 
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person without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the sole purpose of '"exercis[ing] 
unquestioned command of the situation'"). 
A clear majority of jurisdictions considering the issue rely on Wilson to hold that the 
same safety concerns that justify police in ordering passengers out of a stopped vehicle also 
justify police in ordering passengers to remain in the vehicle for the duration of a traffic 
stop.5 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 419 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Clark, 337 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003); Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 
F.3d44,53 (D.C.Cir. 1998); United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3dl0,12-13 (3rd Cir. 1997); 
Carter v. State, 494 S.E.2d 108,109 (Ga. App. 1997); People v. Gonzalez, 704N.E.2d375, 
383 (111. 1998), overruled on other grounds by People v. Sorenson, 752 N.E.2d425,431 (111. 
2001); State v.Roberts, 943 p.2d 1249,1251 (Mont. 1997); People v. Forbes, 72% N.Y.S.2d 
64, 66 (2001); State v. Shearin, 612 S.E.2d 371, 378 (N.C. App. 2005); State v. Hodges, 
631 N.W.2d206, 210 &n.l (S.D. 2001). But see, Wilson v. State, 734 So.2d 1107, 1113 
(Fla. App. 1999), cert, denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000). 
Although the Supreme Court declined in Wilson "to go further and hold that an officer 
may forcibly detain a passenger for the entire duration of the stop," 519 U.S. at 415 n.3, 
courts extending Wilson generally view the safety concerns there recognized as justifying the 
detention of passengers until the traffic stop is completed. See, e.g., Forbes, 728 N.Y.S.2d 
5Even before Wilson, at least one state court had extended Mimms to passengers, 
including police authority to order passengers "back inside the vehicle for safety 
purposes." State v. Webster, 824 P.2d 768, 770 (Ariz. App. 1991). 
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at 66 ("We choose to follow the line of cases which hold that it is within the discretion of 
the police officers on the scene to decide whether it is safer to have the driver and passengers 
exit the vehicle or whether it is safer to maintain the status quo by requiring the driver and 
passengers to remain in the vehicle until the traffic stop is over")). See also Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.6(a), at 647 (4th ed. 2004) ("Common sense suggests that, in 
the ordinary traffic stop situation, the officer is much better off (from the standpoint of 
ensuring against a surprise attack by a passenger) if the passengers remain in the stopped 
vehicle while the citation is prepared and other procedures incident to the stop are carried 
out"); State v. Vandenberg, 81 P.3d 19, 29 (N.M. 20003) ("We decline to say that an 
investigating officer cannot be in as much danger at the end of a traffic stop as at the 
beginning, or at least reasonably believe that to be so"). Cf. Gonzalez, 704 N.E.2d at 382 
(observing that, "as in Wilson, the question concerning detention of a passenger for the entire 
duration of the stop is not presented in this case" and declining to express an opinion on it). 
Accordingly, under Wilson and progeny, police here could lawfully detain defendant and the 
other passengers until the objectives of the traffic stop—-including the arrest of the 
driver—were safely completed. 
B. The objectives of the traffic stop were not complete prior to 
the weapons frisk of defendant's person; thus, defendant 
was lawfully detained at the time. 
Having established that police could detain defendant and the other passengers until 
the lawful objectives of the traffic stop were complete, the question becomes whether 
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defendant was frisked before or after the completion of those objectives. As noted above, 
defendant asserts that the lawful objectives of the stop were completed with the arrest of the 
driver, and further asserts that the driver's arrest was completed before he relinquished his 
knife to police, before the K-9 unit arrived, and before he was frisked. Aplt. Br. at 17 
("Baker does not dispute that the driver was validly arrested. However, the officers had no 
right to detain Baker or any of the passengers once the initial purposes of the stop ended.55); 
see also id. at 11 ("Baker was illegally detained as a matter of law once the officers 
confiscated personal possession(s) and had him wait in the vehicle until a K-9 unit arrived55), 
15 ("Baker asserts that he was illegally detained against his will when Officer Robertson 
called for a K-9 unit55), 19 ("It can not be reasonably asserted that Baker thought he was free 
to leave after the officers confiscated his personal property.55). However, review of 
controlling case law and the undisputed evidence clearly establishes that the business of the 
stop was ongoing when defendant turned over his knife, when the K-9 unit arrived, and when 
defendant was subsequently frisked. Therefore, defendant was frisked prior to the 
completion of the lawful objectives of the traffic stop and his detention at the time was 
reasonable. 
The trial court found that police "were dealing with the driver and her arrest until the 
K-9 [unit] arrived.55 R72 (emphasis added). Defendant nowhere acknowledges this contrary 
finding in his brief, let alone challenges the finding as clearly erroneous. He is thus bound 
by it. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 3,100 P.3d 177 ("Because defendants have failed 
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to properly marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact, we do not 
consider those findings properly challenged and, therefore, assume the evidence supports 
them.") (citation omitted); State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, f 3 n.l, 127 P.3d 1265 
(observing "that a trial court's finding of fact is conclusive unless appellant proves the trial 
court committed clear error and marshals all the record evidence in support of and against 
the finding" (citation omitted)), cert granted, 133 P.3d 437. Accordingly, under Wilson and 
its progeny, defendant wholly fails to establish that his detention prior to the arrival of the 
K-9 unit was unlawful. Moreover, given Wilson and progeny, defendant cannot establish 
that he was unlawfully detained at any time after the K-9 unit arrived, or at the time he was 
frisked. As will be shown below, this is because the driver's arrest continued to be ongoing; 
thus, defendant was not unlawfully detained incident thereto. 
Indeed, it is well established that "when a policeman has a made a lawful custodial 
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, 
search the passenger compartment of that automobile." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 
460 (1981). Therefore, precisely because the driver was indisputably lawfully arrested here, 
police were authorized—as a matter of law—to search not only her person, but the passenger 
compartment of her vehicle. Id. The lawful objectives of this traffic stop would not thus be 
complete until both searches were accomplished. Id. And the passenger compartment was 
not searched until the K-9 unit arrived. In waiting until after the service dog alerted on the 
vehicle to conduct the passenger compartment search, police reasonably pursued a less 
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intrusive means for completing their investigation. Indeed, if the drug dog had not confirmed 
that drugs were inside the passenger compartment, the officers may well have declined to 
search it and allowed the passengers to proceed on their way, so long as one of them was 
legally authorized to drive the vehicle. However, once the service dog alerted to the vehicle, 
the officers immediately removed the passengers, and given the fact that they had just 
retrieved more than a dozen knives from the vehicle occupants, reasonably subjected the 
passengers to a weapons frisk to ensure their safety before proceeding further. See Point 
11(B), infra (addressing reasonableness of the weapons frisk). In sum, the arrest of the driver 
was not complete until the passenger compartment was searched, and defendant was frisked 
before police could safely search the passenger compartment. Therefore, defendant was 
lawfully detained at the time he was frisked. 
1. Defendant's reliance on State v. Chism is misplaced. 
State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, 107 P.3d 706, relied upon by defendant, is not to 
the contrary. Although Chism, like defendant, was also a backseat passenger initially 
detained incident to a traffic stop of the driver (following too closely), id. at \ 2, any 
similarity between the two cases ends there. That is because the passengers in Chism almost 
immediately became the focus of a suspected tobacco violation and their continued detention 
was not therefore merely incidental to a traffic investigation of the driver, as here. This 
Court ultimately held that Chism was unlawfully detained because, even after any reasonable 
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suspicion that Chism and his fellow passengers illegally possessed tobacco was dispelled, the 
officer in Chism continued to investigate the suspected tobacco offense. Id. at ^  3-6,16-17. 
Here, unlike Chism, the investigation remained focused on the traffic purpose of the stop, 
including the driver's arrest for driving on suspension for drugs. As a result, defendant and 
the other passengers continued to be incidentally and lawfully detained until all the lawful 
objectives of the traffic stop, including the protocol attendant to the driver's arrest, were 
safely completed. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (discussing Summers); Belton, 453 U.S. at 
460. 
2. Defendant's reliance on Illinois v. Caballes is misplaced. 
Defendant's reliance on Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), is similarly 
unavailing. An Illinois state trooper stopped Caballes for speeding. Id. at 406. When the 
trooper reported the traffic stop to dispatch, a second trooper overheard the transmission, and 
immediately headed to the scene with his drug-detection dog. Id. Arriving prior to the 
completion of the stop, the second trooper walked his drug-detection dog around Caballes' 
vehicle while the first trooper was in the process of writing Caballes a warning ticket. Id. 
The dog alerted on the trunk, and the troopers thereafter discovered marijuana in Caballes' 
trunk. Id. The trial court denied Caballes' motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that the 
dog alert did not unduly prolong the stop and that it provided probable cause to search. Id. 
at 407. Although an intermediate appellate court affirmed, the state supreme court reversed, 
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holding that the dog sniff had been conducted absent reasonable suspicion and thus 
unlawfully expanded the scope of a routine traffic stop. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court. It held that 
a canine dog sniff that does not prolong an otherwise lawful traffic stop and "that reveals no 
information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 410. Thus, although conducted without 
reasonable suspicion, the dog sniff of Caballes' vehicle was performed while Caballes was 
lawfully detained and was thus reasonable. Id. at 408-410. 
Unlike Caballes, defendant does not here contend that the dog sniff prolonged an 
otherwise lawful traffic stop, but rather, that traffic stop was complete when police arrested 
the driver, well before the dog sniff occurred, and before defendant was frisked. Aplt. Br. 
at 17 ("Baker does not dispute that the driver was validly arrested. However, the officers had 
no right to detain Baker . . . once the initial purposes of the stop ended"); see also R72 
("Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the actual time length of the stop or 
in connection with the K-9 request"). However, as has been shown above, see Point 1(A), 
supra, the driver's arrest was commenced—but not concluded—prior to the dog sniff. 
Indeed, the driver's arrest was ongoing at the time of the dog sniff and throughout the frisk 
of defendant's person. Therefore, just as in Caballes, the instant dog sniff occurred during 
the time that defendant was lawfully detained incident to the traffic stop and was thus 
reasonable. Moreover, even if the instant dog sniff had occurred after the traffic 
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investigation ended as defendant suggests, it was still lawful under Caballes because it was 
based on the officers' reasonable suspicion that the driver continued to be involved in drugs. 
See Caballes, 543 U.S. at408-410; see alsoShephard, 955 P.2d352, 355 (recognizing scope 
of traffic investigation may be extended based on reasonable articulable suspicion of other 
criminal activity). Given these circumstances, it is defendant's reliance on Caballes, not the 
trial court's, which is misplaced. Indeed, the instant dog sniff stands on even firmer ground 
than the dog sniff upheld in Caballes because it occurred during an ongoing traffic stop and 
because it was also supported by a reasonable suspicion of another crime. Police were 
therefore justified in detaining defendant at the time the dog sniff was conducted. Caballes, 
543 U.S. at 408-410; Shephard, 955 P.2d 352, 355; see also Point 1(A), supra. 
Based on the above, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should 
be upheld on the ground that—at the time he was frisked—defendant was lawfully detained 
while police completed the business of the stop. 
POINT II 
THE FRISK OF DEFENDANT'S PERSON WAS JUSTIFIED BY BOTH 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT HE POSSESSED DRUGS 
AND REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT HE WAS ARMED AND 
DANGEROUS 
Given defendant's lawful detention incident to the traffic stop and arrest of the driver, 
the question becomes whether police were justified in frisking defendant. The trial court 
ruled that the frisk of defendant—one of three backseat passengers—was justified on two 
independent grounds: probable cause to believe that the backseat passengers possessed drugs 
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based on the drug-detection dog's alert on the rear driver's side doorhandle, and reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the backseat passengers were armed and dangerous, given the 
unusually large number of knives recovered during the stop. R72-71; see also R150:6-7. 
A. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling upholding 
the frisk of his person fails because he attacks only one of the 
trial court's two independent grounds for its ruling. 
Significantly, defendant attacks only the latter reasonable suspicion justification for 
the frisk on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 19 ("B. The trial court erroneously found that the 
officers were justified in detaining and searching Baker for officer safety reasons" (emphasis 
omitted)). His brief ignores the trial court's independent ruling that the search was justified 
by probable cause. Id. at 19-24. Where, as here, a trial court's judgment rests upon multiple 
independent grounds, an appellant must attack each ground on appeal or the judgment will 
be affirmed. San Antonio Press, Inc. v. Custom Bilt Machinery, 852 S.W.2d 64, 64 (Tex. 
App. 1993); see also James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 744 lP.2d 689, 694 (Ariz. 1986); 
Shrader v. Eli Lily & Co., 639 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. 1994). Thus, even if defendant's 
appellate challenge had merit, it would be insufficient to undermine the trial court's ruling, 
which must therefore be affirmed. 
In any event, as will be shown below, the frisk of defendant's person was justified on 
either ground. 
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B. Police had probable cause to arrest and search the three 
backseat passengers, including defendant, after a drug-
detection dog alerted to the handle on the rear driver's side 
door. 
Although the Fourth Amendment embodies a strong preference for warrants, it has 
long been recognized that in some circumstances, uthe exigencies of the situation" can 
give rise to a compelling need for prompt and thus warrantless action. For example, "[a] 
warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor 
committed in the officer's presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest 
is supported by probable cause." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003). While 
probable cause may be established any number of ways, in traffic stop scenarios like this, 
it is frequently established by a drug-detection dog's positive alert. See Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (observing as part of a hypothetical discussion that "[a] positive 
result [from the canine sniff] would have result in [Royer's] justifiable arrest on probable 
cause"); United States v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 1999) ("As a general 
rule, an alert from a canine with a sufficient accuracy record is sufficient to establish 
probable cause"). See also Wayne R. LaFave Search and Seizure, § 2.2(g), p. 526-27 (4th 
Ed. 2004) ("In light of the careful training which these dogs receive, an 'alert' by a dog is 
deemed to constitute probable cause for an arrest or search"). 
As noted above, it is undisputed here that the dog alert established probable cause 
to search both the passenger compartment of the vehicle and the backseat passengers. See 
R72-71. And for good reason. The search of the passengers in this case, including 
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defendant, is virtually indistinguishable from the search of the passengers in Pringle, 
which case is dispositive here. 
Pringle, like this case involved a traffic stop. Maryland police stopped a car for 
speeding and conducted a consensual search for weapons and narcotics. 540 U.S. at 368. 
The search yielded $763 from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-
seat armrest. Id. When the driver and two passengers, including Pringle, all denied 
ownership of the drugs and money, all three were placed under arrest. Id. at 368-69. 
When Pringle later claimed the cocaine and denied that the driver and the backseat 
passenger had known about the drugs, they were released. Id. Pringle moved to suppress 
the evidence against him on the ground that he was arrested without probable cause. Id. 
The trial court denied his motion and an intermediate appellate court affirmed. Id. "The 
Maryland Court of Appeals, by divided vote, reversed, holding that, absent specific facts 
tending to show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, 'the mere 
finding of cocaine in the back armrest when [Pringle] was a front seat passenger in a car 
being driven by its owner is insufficient to establish probable cause for possession.5" Id. 
at 799 (quoting State v. Pringle, 805 A.2d 1016, 1027 (2002)). The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id. 
The Supreme Court began by reiterating general principles of probable cause. 
First, that the probable cause standard "protects 'citizens from rash and unreasonable 
interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,' while giving 'fair 
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leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection."' Id. (quoting Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1940)). Second, that probable cause is a "practical, 
nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Third, that probable cause is "incapable 
of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities 
and depends on the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 800 (citation omitted). Fourth, 
that "[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for 
belief of guilt, and that the belief of guilt must be particularizied with respect to the 
person to be searched or seized[.]" Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
And finally, that probable cause to arrest is determined by examining "the events leading 
up to the arrest, and then deciding] 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the 
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to' probable cause." Id. 
(quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996)). 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court reviewed the facts leading up to 
Pringle's arrest and emphasized that all three vehicle occupants "failed to offer any 
information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money." Id. Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court held that "it was an entirely reasonable inference . . . that any or all 
three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the 
26 
cocaine." Id. The Supreme Court thus concluded that "there was probable cause to 
believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly." Id. 
In so holding, the Supreme Court expressly rejected Pringle's reliance on Ybarra 
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) and United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). Pringle, 
540 U.S. at 372. The Supreme Court noted that it had held in Ybarra that a search 
warrant for a tavern "did not permit body searches of all the tavern's patrons and that the 
police could not pat down the patrons for weapons, absent individual suspicion." Pringle, 
540 U.S. at 373 (citing Ybarra, AAA U.S. at 92). The Supreme Court distinguished 
Ybarra on the ground that "Pringle and his two companions were in a relatively small 
automobile, not a public tavern." Id. The Supreme Court also reiterated its observation 
in another case, that "'a car passenger—unlike the unwitting tavern patron in 
Ybarra,—will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the 
same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.'" Id. (quoting 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 536 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999)). The Supreme Court thus 
concluded that it was reasonable for the officer in Pringle "to infer a common enterprise 
among the three" vehicle occupants. Id. Given the "quantity of drugs and cash in the 
car," the Supreme Court further remarked that "drug dealing" was likely, and moreover, 
that it was unlikely a dealer would "admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish 
evidence against him." Id. 
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Turning to Di Re, the Supreme Court observed that in that case, police arrested and 
searched three occupants of a car based solely on their investigation of the driver's 
criminal conduct—selling counterfeit gasoline ration coupons to a police informer, who 
along with Di Re, was a passenger in the car. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373. The Supreme 
Court observed that "[a]fter noting that the officers had no information implicating Di Re 
and no information pointing to Di Re's possession of coupons, unless presence in the car 
warranted that inference," it had concluded in Di Re "that the officer lacked probable 
cause to believe that Di Re was involved in the crime." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373-74 
(citing Di Re, 332 U..S. at 592-94). The Supreme Court further noted that Di Re also 
held that "c[a]ny inference that everyone on the scene of a crime is a party to it must 
disappear if the Government informer singles out the guilty person.'" Pringle, 540 U.S. at 
374 (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 594). The Supreme Court distinguished the result in Di 
Re from its result in Pringle on the ground that "[n]o such singling out occurred in 
[Pringle]:'Id. 
The results in Ybarra and Di Re are distinguishable in this case for essentially the 
same reasons they were distinguished by the Supreme Court in Pringle. Indeed, like 
Pringle, and unlike Ybarra, defendant and his four "companions were in a relatively 
small automobile, not a public tavern," and were thus more likely to be involved in a 
"common enterprise." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373. Although police here, unlike Pringle, 
were unaware of the exact amount of drugs involved when they frisked the backseat 
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passengers, they knew that the dog had specifically alerted on the rear, driver's side door 
handle. R70; see also Rl50:6-7. Police reasonably inferred that the drugs on the door 
handle got there from the hand of someone opening the door, and that the backseat 
passengers were the most likely—and most recent—people to have opened the door. 
Given this reasonable inference, together with the driver's known drug history, and the 13 
knives removed from all the vehicle occupants, police had probable cause to believe that 
a common drug enterprise existed among the five vehicle occupants. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 
373. This is particularly true here, in contrast to DiRe, because "[n]o . . . singling out 
occurred." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 374 (distinguishing DiRe). 
The few other jurisdictions to consider this issue have similarly ruled that a dog-
alert, together with information linking the detected drugs to passengers, establishes 
probable cause for their arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F.3d 1507, 
1510 n.l (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding passenger's arrest following positive canine alert 
which occurred during consensual encounter to investigate suspected drug activity of 
vehicle occupants); People v. Staley, 778 N.E.2d 362, 367-69 (111. 2002) (upholding 
passenger's arrest following canine alert on passenger-side interior door panel, where 
passenger was also seen visiting a "known drug house," returned to a car that was 
unusually parked, and refused to make eye contact during investigative stop). Compare 
State v. Wallace, 812 A.2d 291, 302 (Md. 2003) (holding "that a positive canine scan to a 
vehicle's interior compartment generally, without more, does not rise to probable cause to 
29 
search all passengers of that vehicle" (emphasis added)); see also State v. Ofori, 
A.2d (Md. App. 2006), 2006 WL 2572117 (questioning "vitality of State v. Wallace" 
"in view of its heavy reliance on . . . Pringle v. State, [] 805 A.2d 1016 (2002), which was 
subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Pringle"). 
Based on the above, police had probable cause to believe that the drugs detected in 
the driver's vehicle, or on the person of one or more of the backseat passengers seated 
therein, were part of a common enterprise among the five vehicle occupants. The trial 
court's ruling should therefore be upheld. 
C Police had reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant for weapons, 
given that they recovered 13 knives from the vehicle occupants, 
including defendant. 
Even assuming arguendo that police lacked probable cause to arrest and search 
defendant, the trial court's ruling may still be upheld on the independent ground that the 
frisk of his person was justified because police reasonably suspected defendant—and the 
other passengers—were armed and dangerous. 
Although police may exercise "unquestioned command" over passengers during a 
traffic stop, Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703), a weapons 
frisk still may not be conducted absent individual suspicion that a suspect is armed and 
dangerous. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968); State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ [13, 
78 P.3d 590. The reasonableness of a weapons frisk is evaluated objectively, according 
to the totality of the circumstances. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ 14. "To determine 
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reasonableness, a court should question whether 'the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of the seizure or search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that 
the action taken was appropriate.'" Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 14 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
21-22). "[D]ue weight must be given, not to [an officer's] inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or 'hunch,' but to specific reasonable inferences which [an officer ] is entitled 
to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Officers may 
thus "draw upon their own experience and training to make determinations based on the 
cumulative facts before them that may elude an untrained person." Warren, 2003 UT 36, 
f 14 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). An officer's subjective 
interpretation of the facts, or subjective belief, "is one of several possible articulable facts 
a court may consider as part of the totality of the circumstances." Id. at \ 21. Finally, 
"Courts must view the articulable facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide 
the facts and evaluate them in isolation from each other." Id. at f 14 (citing Arvizu, 534 
U.S. at 274). 
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances including the officers' recovery of 
13 knives, the trial court upheld the weapons frisk of defendant's person as justified by 
reasonable safety concerns. See R71-69. Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling on 
the grounds that it "ignored the officers' straightforward testimony regarding officer 
safety," and that "[i]f the officers were truly concerned for safety . . . they certainly would 
not have just allowed the passengers to sit in the dark vehicle; rather, it is likely that they 
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would have called for additional back-up, ordered the passengers out of the car to frisk 
them, or at least ordered everyone to keep their hands w[h]ere they could be seen."6 Aplt. 
Br. at 19, 23. Defendant further asserts that "the officers each admitted that the search 
took place only after the drug dog indicated that he had found drugs," see id. at 23 (citing 
R149:12-13, 21; R150:19-20, 30-32), and that "Officer Robertson testified specifically 
that the search o[f] [defendant] was done to find drugs, not weapons." Id. 
Although an officer's subjective interpretation of the facts is properly taken into 
account in evaluating the reasonableness of a weapons frisk, the trial court correctly 
recognized that two of three officers' subjective lack of fear did not undermine the 
objective reasonableness of the frisk. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 19 (holding that "an 
officer's subjective belief alone does not invalidate an otherwise objectively reasonable 
Terry frisk"). Rather, the trial court correctly recognized that the recovery of 13 knives 
from the vehicle occupants made this an unusual case, and in conjunction with the other 
circumstances of the stop, compelled the conclusion that the frisk was objectively 
reasonable. R71-69. 
6Defense counsel elicited affirmations from Officers Bartell and Robertson that 
they were not in subjective fear for their safety despite recovering the large number of 
knives because the passengers' behavior had been non-threatening. See Rl50:13, 31. 
Although Officer Rockwood similarly testified that the passengers' behavior had not 
alarmed him, he remained concerned about the large number of knives retrieved from the 
vehicle occupants. R150:21-23. 
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Indeed, the fact that police here retrieved 13 knives from the vehicle occupants 
during the traffic stop is sufficient to distinguish the result in Warren, where the supreme 
court declined to uphold a frisk, in part, because the lone officer in that case testified that 
Warren "did nothing to cause [him] to be alarmed and that he had no reason to believe 
that Warren was armed and dangerous." 2003 UT 36, f 32. Significantly, the officer in 
Warren observed no weapons upon approaching Warren, or at any time during the traffic 
stop. Id. at TJI2-7. Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (upholding protective 
search of Long's car, and by implication prior frisk of his person, incident to DUI 
investigation, because it was late at night in a rural area and a hunting knife had been seen 
on the floor of the car). Thus, in declining to uphold the frisk in Warren, the supreme 
court recognized that "the case was a difficult one," in part, because it "lack[ed] the kind 
of obvious articulable facts that would make the determination easier[.]" Warren, 2003 
UT 36, ffl[ 30, 33. Given the 13 knives recovered here, this case, unlike Warren, does not 
lack obvious articulable facts that make the determination easier. Id. at f^ 13. 
Although the trial court properly emphasized the unusually large number of knives 
recovered during the traffic stop, other factors also support the reasonableness of the 
instant frisk: the inherent dangerousness of traffic stops, the officers5 suspicion that the 
driver's drug involvement may be ongoing, the drug-detection dog alert on the vehicle, 
the fact that the five vehicle occupants outnumbered the three to four officers variously at 
the scene, the lateness of the hour, and the darkness of the area. R71-69. See Warren, 
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2003 UT 36, f 32. See also United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 
2005) (observing that "'the fact that there is more than one occupant of the vehicle 
increases the possible sources of harm to the officer,5" (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 
U.S. 408 (1998))); United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2004) (frisk 
permissible, as officer reasonably suspected defendant "involved in drug dealing59 a crime 
"typically associated with some sort of weapon"). 
Given the totality of these circumstances, including the recovery of more than a 
dozen knives from the vehicle occupants, the trial court reasonably determined the 
weapons frisk was justified, even if the passengers were cooperative, and not "overt[ly] 
threatening]," when they relinquished their knives. R71-69. Indeed, this Court has 
previously recognized that police are not "bound to accept" a suspect's explanations or 
representations. See State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, f 11, 47 P.3d 932 (recognizing 
officer was not bound to accept Beach's innocent explanation); State v. McLean, 1999 
UT App 114, 1999 WL 33244734, *3 (unpublished) (recognizing officer "was not 
required to take the word of the driver that the weapons were unloaded, nor did he have to 
wait for a passenger to make a threatening move before he checked the weapons to assure 
his own safety").7 Thus, police were reasonably concerned that the vehicle occupants 
may not have turned over all their knives or weapons. 
7
 A copy of McLean is attached in addendum D. 
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Finally, given the obvious articulable safety concern created by the presence of the 
13 knives, the frisk was reasonable even if one of the officers was primarily motivated to 
find drugs. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1135 (Utah 1994) (holding that a traffic 
stop based on either an observed violation, or a reasonable suspicion of a violation, is 
constitutionally justified, "despite the officer's motivations or suspicions that are 
unrelated to the traffic offense."); Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^  14 (holding that reasonableness 
is determined by asking whether the facts available at the time of the search would 
"'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 
appropriate") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22)). Indeed, it is well established that the 
reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective standard. See Terry, 392 
U.S. 21-22; Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). Under this standard, an 
officer's motive for acting is irrelevant. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding that searches 
are examined "without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers 
involved"); accordBrigham City v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 12943, 1948 (2006) (holding that 
"[t]he officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant"). An officer's subjective 
understanding of the legal justification for acting is also irrelevant. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 
138 (holding that "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which 
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action 
does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, 
justify that action"); accord Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (same); 
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Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (same); United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that "it is of no moment that [the officer] . . . did not 
himself suspect that respondent was armed"). Thus, the trial court correctly recognized 
that one officer's subjective motivation was irrelevant to the obvious objective safety 
concern. R71-69. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Court of Appeals, 2005 
UT 18, [^ 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant 
and the bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by 
oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted ^ b c t o b e r 2006. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
Oi^OdA^ 
1ARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Wednesday, November 2 4 , 2004; Provo, Utah 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
-OoO-
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Luke Zachary Baker; 
Case No. 041403985. It's No. 123 on the calendar today. 
Jennifer Gowans is here on behalf of the defendant who is 
present. Guy Probert, Deputy Utah County Attorney, here on 
behalf of the State of the Utah. 
You may proceed. 
MR. PROBERT: State calls Officer Robertson. 
THE COURT: Come forward and be sworn, please. 
RAYMOND ROBERTSON, 
Called by the State, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Be seated to my left and respond to 






































Would you state your full name and spell your last 
Raymond Robertson, R-O-B-E-R-T-S-O-N. 
What is your occupation? 








How long have you been a police officer? 
About five years. 
On the 30th of September of this year, were you on 
I was. 









Did you arrest the driver for a suspended license? 
That is correct. 
What was the basis for the license being suspended? 
Suspended for drugs. 
As a result of that drug suspension, did you call a 





When the K-9 unit arrived, what did it do? 


























required to do. And after his procedure, he told me that his 
dog indicated that there was the presence of a controlled 
substance in a vehicle. 
Q What were you doing at the time that the officer 
arrived with the K-9? 
A Taking care of the driver, searching him. 
Q Had you spoken to any of the other occupants of the 
vehicle at that time? 
A I think I spoke to one of the rear passengers about a 
knife that was in plain view, I think that's about all. I 
think a coupie of my other partners had obtained knives that 
were in plain view as well at that time. That's about i t 
Q Had you told anybody that they were not free to 
leave? 
A No. 
Q When the K-9 had hit on the vehicle, what did you 
resolve to do about the vehicle and the passengers? 
A I pulled each one out individually and searched each 
one individually. 
Q Where was the defendant seated in the vehicle? 
A I want to say he was the right rear passenger. 
Q When he was removed from the vehicle, was he frisked 
by one of the officers that were there? 
A That's correct. 
Q Was something found in his possession? 







































What was found in his possession? 
In one of his - I think his left-front pocket was 
glass pipe that was commonly used to smoke marijuana. 
Was he arrested for possession of that marijuana 
That's correct 
And taken to the police station? 
That's correct 
Did you search him at the police station? 
I did. 




A small baggy of methamphetamine. 
Were you able to tell from the substance itself that 
it was methamphetamine or did you submit it for analysis? 
A I did what's called a field test in our police 
department, which indicated a positive test, and then I also 




Did you receive a report from the Crime Lab? 
I did. 
MR. PROBERT: May I approach the officer? 


























Q (By Mr. Probert) I'll show you this document which 
has been marked State Exhibit 1. What is that document? 
A This is the findings from the Utah Crime Lab. 
Q Is there something on that document which identifies 
as relating to the defendant in this case? 
A That's correct. 
Q What does it say about the substance that you 
submitted to the Crime Lab in relation to this defendant? 
A Methamphetamine was identified in the plastic baggy; 
total weight of the clear crystals was 71 grams. 
Q Are you able to identify the person that you took out 
of the vehicle that night in the courtroom today? 
A Yes. 
Q Where is he seated? 
A At the defendant's table. 
MR. PROBERT: May the record show he has identified 
the defendant. 
THE COURT: It may. 
Q (By Mr. Probert) When the defendant was being 
searched, was anything else found on his person? 
A Yeah. In one of his shoes,! want to say his right 
shoe. It may have been his left --1 can refer to my 
report - was found another glass pipe commonly used to smoke 
methamphetamine. 
Q So in one of his shoes you found a methamphetamine 
pipe? 
A That's correct 
Q What was there about the location of the stop of the 
driver that made the area a drug free zone? 
A We were very close to Grove Crest Elementary School. 
We were within less than a thousand feet of Grove Crest 
Elementary. 
Q What's the address? Do you know the address of Grove 
Creek Elementary School? 
A It borders 300 East and 1100 North, and we were at 
350 East and 1100 North. 
MR. PROBERT: No further questions. 
THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
MS. GOWANS: Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. GOWANS: 
Q Now, Officer Robertson, you recovered other evidence 
that was sent to the Crime Lab, is that correct in this case, 
in addition to the methamphetamine that you're indicating was 
in Mr. Baker's possession? 
A That's correct. 
MR. PROBERT: Objection, Your Honor, relevancy. 
THE COURT: It may have some relevance, but his 































(By Ms. Gowans) You didn't send anything other than I 
O h ~ 
Well, the Crime Lab report indicates that you sent 
three items; is that correct? 
A 
Q 
That's correct. I 












On her you found a baggy of methamphetamine; is that 
MR. PROBERT: Objection. Judge -
THE COURT: I'll have him respond. 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
(By Ms. Gowans) And several other empty baggies, 
That's correct 
Did you send any of those empty baggies? 
No. 
Just so I understand, the baggy that was found on her 





Is it okay to look at my -
Oh, you bet 
Yes, that's correct. 
So the baggy that was on her just had residue; is 


























that correct? I 
A 
Q 
I had a measurable amount I 
You had a measurable amount 
Was there more in her baggy than what you found in 







There was not I 




Now you indicated that you decided to call for a K-9 
because Ms. Robertson - her license had been suspended for 





That's my last name. 
Oh, excuse me, Ms. Harding. 
Say that again. 
You indicated that you called a K-9 to respond 
because Ms. Harding had had her license suspended for drugs; 






There was no other reason? 
There's no other reason. 
Where did the dog indicate on the car when it 
arrived? 
A That would have to be given by the K-9 officer. 
11 
1 Q So you don't know where that happened? 
2 A (Shakes head negatively). 
3 Q How long did it take from the time that you arrested 
4 Ms. Harding until the K-9 unit arrived? 
5 A Well, we used police radios to gather information. 
6 When dispatch gave the information that her license was 
7 suspended, I asked for a K-9 immediately at that time. And 
8 then after that time, I had walked up to the car and then 
9 arrested her for the violation, and they arrived shortly after 
10 she was placed under arrest. I think we were just looking at 
11 it I think it was just approximately 12 minutes. 
12 Q Did you tell anybody in the vehicle at that time that 
13 they were free to leave? 
14 A No, I did not. 
15 Q What was your reason for searching Mr. Baker? 
16 A After the dog had indicated on the vehicle. 
17 Q So your reason for searching Mr. Baker and ail the 
18 other passengers was because the dog indicated on the car, on 
19 the exterior of the vehicle? 
20 A That's correct 
21 Q There's no other reason why you searched him? 
22 A No. Actually there was. 
23 Q You're changing your testimony? 
24 I A \ am. 
25 Q What was the other reason? 
A Because of the known knife issue. We had several 
knives that were in plain view when we walked up to the 
vehicle. 
Q Where were the knives located? 
A Well, the first knife I had seen when I first 
approached the vehicle was by the - I think it was the center 
occupant in the center backseat It was in plain view in a 
leather sheath, fairly large knife. I believe that after 
everybody was searched, there were out of the vehicle a total 
of 13 knives that came out of the vehicle. 
Q So you searched all the passengers because you felt 
that it was illegal for them to have the knives? 
A No, it's a safety issue. 
Q Did anybody in the vehicle threaten you? 
A No. 
Q Did they talk to you? 
A Did they talk to me? 
Q Uh-huh, before you searched them? 
A I don't understand the question. 
Q Did they say anything to you? Was there a reason, 
other than the presence of the knives, that you felt that your 
safety was at risk? 
A No. 
Q So when you searched Mr. Baker, you asked him to get 
out of the car, correct? 
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1 I A \ think it was Officer Rockwood that actually asked 
2 him to get out of the car. 
3 Q Did Mr. Baker have any knives on his person? 
4 A When he was searched by me and Officer Rockwood, I 
5 don't believe there was any knives found on him at that time. 
6 I think he had already given any knives that he had to another 
7 officer. 
8 Q When did that occur? 
9 A That occurred while I was taking care of the driver 
10 because I had indicated to other officers, backup officers 
11 that had responded, that there were knives in plain view. And 
12 I I believe he walked up and talked to those passengers in 
13 specific about the knives, and they gave him - handed him the 
14 knives. 
15 Q You don't know that he had actually had anything on 
16 his possession? 
17 A Not as far as a knife goes. And I don't recall 
18 whether he claimed one or any at all at the end. 
19 Q Was Mr. Baker under arrest when he was searched the 
20 first time? 
21 A No. 
22 Q So at that time when he was searched you didn't have 
23 any reason to believe that he committed a crime? 
24 A That's correct 


























free to leave after Kassie was arrested, Ms. Harding? 
A Because I had a K-9 en route. 
Q Were they not free to leave while the K-9 was en 
route? 
A I don't have an answer for that. I did not tell them 
they were free to go, and nobody asked either that they could 
go. 
Q From what you're telling me, because the K-9 was 
en route, they were not free to leave; is that correct? 
A I did not walk up to the car and say, "You guys are 
all free to go." 
Q That's not the question. You just told me or you 
just testified that you didn't tell them they were free to 
leave because the K-9 was en route. So from what I'm 
gathering from that is they were not free to leave because you 
had a K-9 en route and you wanted them to stay; is that 
correct? 
A I had the K-9 en route and we were still at a traffic 
stop. I still don't understand the question correctly. I 
mean, were they free to leave, is that a question? 
Q Were they free to leave? 
A No. 
Q When was Luke arrested? 
A I think Luke was the first one pulled out of the 
vehicle, maybe the second one pulled out of the vehicle. 
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1 Q So he was arrested when he was pulled out of the 
2 vehicle? 
3 A After he was searched, that's correct. 
4 Q After he was searched he was arrested because you 
5 found the glass pipe? 
6 A Two glass pipes. 
7 Q In his pocket? 
8 A Correct 
9 Q Initially, right? 
10 A Right 
11 Q It was after you arrested Mr. Baker that he was 
12 searched again and you found another pipe in his shoe, 
13 correct, or you continued to search him; is that a fair 
14 statement? 
15 A Continued to search. 
16 Q Then when he was taken to the police department 
17 because he was arrested, that's when the additional baggy of 
18 methamphetamine was found on his person? 
19 A Correct 
20 Q You wouldn't have found that if he hadn't been 
21 arrested obviously, correct? 
22 A That's correct 
23 MS. GOWANS: I don't think I have any other 
24 questions, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. PROBERT: Yes, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PROBERT: 
Q Officer, you said to me in direct that you were still 
working with the driver when the K-9 arrived? 
A I think she had been placed in the back of the 
vehicle just shortly within a minute of him arriving. 
Q Within a minute? 
A Roughly, just a rough guess. 
Q Can you be more specific about that. Did you note a 
time when you had put her in the vehicle? 
A Well, my dispatch had indicated that she had a 
suspended driver's license, so after that time I had - Rex 
told me that I request a K-9. After I requested a K-9,1 
walked back up to the vehicle and pulled her out of the 
vehicle, asked her to step out of the vehicle. She was placed 
under arrest for driving on suspension, and she was searched 
incident to her arrest at that time. You know, the time frame 
from pulling her out and searching her and putting her in the 
back of the vehicle was within a few minutes of the K-9 
arriving. 
Q Did you put in the report the time that you requested 
the K-9? 



























Q What was that? 
A What time it arrived or what time I requested it? 
Q What time you requested i t 
A 1:21 in the morning. 
Q Did you have a response about the K-9 being en route? 
A Dispatch advised me at 1:22, one minute later, that 
Orem City Police Department K-9 would be responding. 
Q When did it arrive? 
A 1:34. 
Q This took place in Pleasant Grove? 
A That's correct 
Q I think you told me that the defendant was arrested 
after you had found the pipe in his shoe. I got the 
impression from what you said to Ms. Gowans that perhaps he 
was arrested after you found the pipe in his pocket but before 
you found the pipe in his shoe. Do you know at which point he 
was arrested? 
A As in placed under arrest? 
Q Was he placed under arrest before you found the pipe 
in his shoe or after you found the pipe in his shoe? 
A I believe he was placed in handcuffs and under arrest 
after the pipe in his shoe was found. 
Q You said to Ms. Gowans that you didn't have any 
reason to detain the individual after the K-9 had hit on the 


























detained him because the K-9 hit on the vehicle? 
A I did detain him because the K-9 hit on the vehicle, 
yes. 
MR. PROBERT: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Ms. Gowans, anything further? 
MS. GOWANS: Just a couple of things, Your Honor, I 
apologize. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. GOWANS: 
Q Do you typically call for a K-9 unit if you arrest 
somebody who is driving on a suspended license for drugs? 
A Yes. 
Q So you always do that? 
A Yes. 
Q You indicated that you have been a police officer 
five years, correct? 
A That's correct 
Q So you prepared a lot of these reports, I assume? 
A Yes. 
Q You know that defense attorneys and prosecutors and 
judges rely on the information in these reports to be 
accurate? 
A That's correct 
Q In your police report you don't indicate anything, do 
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1 you, about fearing for officer safety? In fact, if I could 
2 just refer you to the second page, you indicate at the top of 
3 that page that the K-9 indicated on the vehicle and 
4 immediately each person was taken out of the car one by one 
5 and searched; is that correct? 
6 MR. PROBERT: Where does the word "immediately" « 
7 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I don't see the word 
8 "immediately." 
9 MS. GOWANS: It's not there. Because you say at the 
10 top of that page you say, "The exterior search was performed. 
11 The K-9 indicated." And then the very next paragraph, "Each 
12 person was taken out of the car one by one." 
13 MR. PROBERT: Ask that the word "immediately" be 
14 stricken. 
15 MS. GOWANS: No objection. 
16 THE COURT: It may. 
17 THE WITNESS: The report does say, "An exterior 
18 search was performed and the K-9 indicated on the vehicle per 
19 Officer Lopez." 
20 Q (By Ms. Gowans) Then immediately after that in the 
21 next paragraph -
22 I A Ho "immediate." It says, "Each person was taken out 
23 of the car one by one." 
24 Q Right I'm not saying immediately, as in your 
25 report, I'm just saying immediately following that you 
indicate that the individuals were taken out of the car and 
searched one by one; is that a fair statement? 
A That's correct 
Q So they were actually searched because the K-9 
indicated on the vehicle? 
A Yes, which I indicated that to you as well. 
Q In fact, all of the knives that were taken from the 
vehicle were actually given to Officer Rockwood before the K-9 
indicated on the vehicle; is that a fair statement? 
A I think they were given to a different officer, 
Officer Bartell. 
Q That was before the K-9 indicated on the vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q So there were no officer safety issues at that point? 
A I believe on - no. 
MS. GOWANS: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you very much, 
Any other witnesses? 
MR. PROBERT: No, Your Honor. 
MS. GOWANS: We'll submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. One of those has been marked. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Count 1 is possession or use of 
methamphetamine, a controlled substance in a drug free zone, 
appears to be a felony. 
20 21 
1 THE WITNESS: It's just Counts 5 and 6, Your Honor. 
2 MS. GOWANS: That's correct, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Count 5, possession or use of 
4 methamphetamine, a controlled substance, a second degree 
5 felony; did knowingly, intentionally possess or use a 
6 controlled substance; to wit methamphetamine, committed the 
7 offense in a drug free zone. There's probable cause that that 
8 offense was committed and probable cause that this defendant 
9 committed the offense. 
10 Count 6 is possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug 
11 free zone, a Class A misdemeanor. There is probable cause 
12 that that offense was committed and that this defendant 
13 committed the offense. 
14 Having found probable cause, let's set it for the 
15 next hearing for entry of plea. 
16 MS. GOWANS: Your Honor, I anticipate filing a motion 
17 to suppress. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MS. GOWANS: I believe under the new rule, the State 
20 doesn't have to submit anything until after the hearing, and 
21 so we can go ahead and file our motion and we can do that 
22 relatively quickly. And the court could go ahead and set -
23 well, actually, since we've just had the hearing, I suppose we 
24 could just brief it and submit it to the court and set it for 


























MR. PROBERT: Just because the State doesn't have to 
respond, doesn't mean that the State doesn't want to respond. 
THE COURT: File your motion within -- what 
reasonable period of time, counsel? How much time do you 
need? 
MS. GOWANS: If we could have a couple weeks to file 
the motion. I have a lot of scheduling issues coming up in 
the next few weeks. 
THE COURT: Let's set it for oral argument, giving 
the State an opportunity to assess the briefing. 
MS. GOWANS: Maybe if we could go out about six 
weeks, that will give us time to reply. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
THE CLERK: January 5 at 1:30. 
MS. GOWANS: That's fine with me. 
THE COURT: January 5th at 1:30. I'll have him sign 
a promise to appear in connection with that next date. 
State's motion to withdraw the Exhibit? 
MR. PROBERT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Grant your motion. Thank you very much. 
MR. PROBERT: Thank you. 
MS. GOWANS: Thank you, Judge. 
(Proceedings in the above-entitled 
matter were concluded.) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
— 0OQ-
THE COURT: You may call your first witness. 
MR. PROBERT: The State calls — I have two witnesses 
in the courtroom today, Your Honor, one is Officer Robertson, 
who is the investigating officer, and ITm calling Officer 
Lopez. 
THE COURT: He may remain. 
Come forward and be sworn, please. Raise your right 
hand. 
ART LOPEZ, 
Called by the State, having been duly 
Sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Be seated to my left. Respond to 
questions from Counsel, please. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PROBERT: 
Q Would you state your full name and spell your last 
name, please. 
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A ItTs Art Lopez, L-O-P-E-Z. 
Q Your occupation? 
A I'm a police officer. 
Q With which agency? 
A Orem City. 
Q Are you trained as a K-9 officer? 
A Yes, sir. I'm certified in the State of Utah as a 
canine handler. 
Q Were you called out on the 30th of September 2004, to 
assist a Pleasant Grove officer with a K-9 sniff of a vehicle? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Where did that call take you? 
A I donTt remember the exact address. According to my 
report, it was 350 East 1100 North in Pleasant Grove. 
Q When you got to the scene, how many people were 
inside the vehicle? 
A If I remember correctly, there were four people 
inside the vehicle. The driver seat was unoccupied. 
Q How many officers were at the scene? 
A Approximately three other officers. 
Q When you say "approximately,11 can you be definite? 
A There were three other officers on the scene. 
Q I think you said that the driver's seat was vacant so 
that one person had been removed from the vehicle; is that 
correct? 
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A Yes, sir, I believe so. 
Q What did you do when you got there? 
A I made a safety check of the exterior of the vehicle. 
I do this each time before I deploy my police service dog. 
Q The safety check is to protect the safety of the dog? 
A Yes, sir. To make sure there's no glass, metal, even 
possibly narcotics outside the vehicle, also to make sure the 
vehicle is turned off. 
Q Did you then put your K-9 over the vehicle? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q On the outside? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q How did the K-9 respond to the vehicle? 
A He first indicated on the trunk of the vehicle on the 
driver's side by scratching. That's his indication. 
Q How long were you at the scene — sorry. That's his 
indication? 
A Yes, that's his first indication. And then we 
continued to search the exterior of the vehicle. I start on 
the driver's side, go around to the passenger side, and then I 
go back around. Again, he indicated on the trunk of the 
vehicle; and then he continued back along the driver's side, 
and then he also indicated on the driver's handle — the 
driver's rear passenger handle of the vehicle, the rear door. 
Q He indicated twice on the vehicle? 









you at the scene after the dog hit on 
A At least 10 minutes. We did — my police dog did 
search the interior of the vehicle also. 
Q Did you see any weapons that were taken out of the 
vehicle? 
A I noticed quite a few knives on the hood of the 
patrol car that was directly behind the vehicle. 
Q Were any of those taken out while you were actually 
on the scene? 
A I do not remember seeing any of the knives being 
taken out. 
Q Were any of the passengers of the vehicle taken out 
while you were there? 
A Yes, sir. They were all removed while I was there. 
MR. PROBERT: I don't have any further questions of 
this witness, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
MS. GOWANS: Your Honor, I don't have any questions 
for this witness, and I would just note for the record that 
this information isn't anything in addition or relevant to 
what really happened in this case. I also note we've already 
briefed the issue. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may step down. Thank you. 
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MR. PROBERT: The State calls Officer Mike Bartell. 
THE COURT: Come forward. Raise your right hand. Be 
sworn by the clerk of the court, please. 
MIKE BARTELL, 
Called by the State, having been duly 
Sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Be seated to my left and respond to 
questions from Counsel, please. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PROBERT: 
Q Officer, would you state your full name and spell 
your last name for the record, please. 
A Mike Bartell, B-A~R-T~E-L-L. 
Q What is your occupation? 
A Police officer. 
Q With what agency? 
A Pleasant Grove. 
Q How long have you been with Pleasant Grove? 
A About eight years. 
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Q On the 30th of September of 2004, did you assist 
Officer Robertson of the Pleasant Grove Police Department on a 
stop of a vehicle that he had conducted? 
A Yes. 
Q When you arrived at the scene, what did you do? 
A I believe at that time he had one individual out of 
the vehicle. I approached the vehicle and made contact with 
the other people inside the vehicle. 
Q What did you notice when you were looking inside the 
vehicle? 
A One of the rear passengers advised me that he had a 
knife. He had set it up on his thigh and just wanted me to be 
aware that it was there. 
Q There were four people in the vehicle at the time? 
A I believe so. 
Q What did you do as a result of that one knife being 
produced? 
A I told him that, well, I better take the knife until 
we finished up with the stop. I asked if there were anymore 
knives in the vehicle. 
Q What happened when you asked if there were anymore 
knives in the vehicle? 
A Everybody started handing me knives. 
Q Everybody in the vehicle gave you a knife into your 
possession? 
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A Yeah. I donft recall how many from each person, but 
everybody at least handed me one knife. 
Q So you recovered 12 knives? 
A I believe so. ITm not sure on the exact count. 
Q You're not sure whether you recovered 12 or whether 
somebody else recovered 12? 
MS. GOWRNS: Objection, Your Honor. Leading. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: I donft think it's leading. It's a 
restatement of what he stated. Overruled. 
MS. GOWANS: I didn't hear the officer testify about 
the number of knives. Maybe I missed that, but Mr. Probert 
suggested that. 
THE COURT: Well, if you wish to voir dire the 
officer — 
Q (By Mr. Probert) How many knives were taken out of 
the vehicle all together? 
A I wasn't sure how many was taken out. 
Q You testified you got a knife from every person 
inside the vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q But you're not sure how many? 
A Yes. 
MR. PROBERT: Nothing further of this witness, Your 
Honor. 
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THE COURT: Cross-examination? 
MS. GOWANS: Yes, Your Honor. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. GOWANS: 
Q Officer Bartell, are you a member of the Utah County 
Major Crimes Task Force? 
A No. 
Q When you indicated that one of the backseat 
passengers — is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Indicated to you that he had a knife, and he 
voluntarily gave you that information, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Where was Mr. Baker sitting? 
A You know, I couldnft tell you where Mr. Baker was. 
Q Was that Mr. Baker who indicated that he had a knife? 
A It was, I believe, the middle passenger. I don't 
know who that was. 
Q You testified that every one of the passengers gave 
you a knife? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Including Mr. Baker? 
A If he was in the backseat, yeah, or the front. 
Q If he was in the front seat, did the front seat 
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passenger give you a knife? 
A I believe so, yes. 
Q Do you know that? 
A Yes. 
Q So you're sure — 
A I got knives from everybody. 
Q What kind of knives were they? 
A Some were pocket knives. I believe one set was a set 
of throwing knives. 
Q So can you be more specific? How many pocket knives 
did you find? 
A I don't know the ratios of which. 
Q When you say throwing knives, can you be a little 
more specific of what you mean? 
A I guess they are knives that are used for throwing in 
competitions. They're like a solid knife. The handle is just 
a solid steel or whatever it's made out of. 
Q How large were they? 
A These ones that were taken, I'm not sure. I've seen 
different throwing knives in different sizes just in stores 
that I've looked at. As far as the ones I've taken — 
Q Were they 3 inches, 10 inches; do you have an 
estimate of how large these knives were? 
A I'd say about 3 to 4 inches. 
Q So they were small? 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 12 
A Yeah, yeah. 
Q The passengers voluntarily relinquished those knives 
to you? 
A Yes. 
Q You weren't aware of them until they handed them to 
you? 
A Just the one that the individual in the backseat had. 
Q Right, but with the others, when you said if there 
were any others, you weren't aware that there were. They just 
handed those over to you voluntarily, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q So they were all cooperative with you? 
A Yes. 
Q Nobody was threatening to you? 
A No. 
Q Nobody did anything that made you fear for your 
safety; is that a fair statement? 
A Yes* 
MS. GOWANS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. 
MR. PROBERT: The State calls Mr. Rockwood. 
THE COURT: Raise your right hand and be sworn by the 
clerk of the court, please. 
CHRIS ROCKWOOD, 
Called by the State, having been duly 
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Sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE COURT: Be seated to my left. Respond to 
questions from counsel. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PROBERT: 
Q Would you state your name, please, officer. 
A My name is Chris Lavar Rockwood, R-0-C-K-W-O-O-D. 
Q What is your occupation? 
A I'm a police officer for the City of Orem. 
Q How long have you been serving the City of Orem in 
that capacity? 
A Fourteen and a half years• 
Q Do you have training and experience in the 
recognition of marijuana and paraphernalia? 
A I do. 
Q What sort of training have you had in that regard? 
A I've had training at post. I've always been a police 
officer in Wyoming and had training there, and just over the 
years seeing marijuana and paraphernalia. 
Q Have you made previous marijuana and paraphernalia 
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arrests? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q Are you familiar with the smell of marijuana? 
A I am. 
Q On the 30th of September 2004, did you stop on a 
traffic stop of another officer to assist him with that stop? 
A I did. 
Q Was that in your city? 
A No, it was not. 
Q Who was the officer? 
A The officer that was on the stop was Officer 
Robertson, and he works for Pleasant Grove. 
Q When you were at the scene, did an officer obtain 
knives from the vehicle that Officer Robertson had stopped? 
A Yes, they had. 
Q Did you see those knives? 
A I did. 
Q While Officer Robertson was dealing with the driver 
of the vehicle, did you assist him by getting a person out of 
the vehicle? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did you pat down the occupant of the vehicle? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Was it after you had seen one of those knives? 
A Yes. 
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MS. GOWANS: Objection, Your Honor. It's leading. 
THE COURT: Let's confirm how many knives he saw. 
Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Probert) Do you know how many knives you 
saw? 
A Not a specific number. I know there were more than 
five. 
Q Where were they? 
A They were on the hood of the car. 
Q Do you recognize the person you patted down in court 
day? 
A Yes. 
Q What is he wearing? 
A HeTs wearing a sweater with black and white 
pinstripes on the sleeves, seated next to the defense 
attorney. 
MR. PROBERT: Your Honor, may the record show the 
identification of the defendant by this witness? 
THE COURT: So noted. 
Q (By Mr. Probert) Who actually got him out of the 
vehicle? 
A I did. 
Q How many other people were in the vehicle at that 
time? 
A As I recall there was one in the front passengerTs 
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seat. Luke was one of three in the rear passengerTs seat. 
Q Did you have a concern if there are knives — 
MS. GOWANS: Objection; leading. 
Q (By Mr. Probert) What would be your concerns if 
there are knives in a vehicle? 
MS. GOWRNS: Objection; leading. 
MR. PROBERT: That's not a leading question, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Officer safety. 
Q (By Mr. Probert) You patted him down after seeing 
those knives? 
MS. GOWAtJS: Objection; leading. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. 
Q (By Mr. Probert) What did you find as you patted him 
down? 
A I found a bulge in his front pocket which later ended 
up being a marijuana pipe. 
Q When you say front pocket, was that something in his 
jacket or his pants? 
A No, in his pants. 
Q What did you say when you felt the object in the 
front pocket of his pants? 
A Just asked him if I could retrieve it and asked him 
what it was. 
Q How did he respond when you asked him what it was? 
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A He explained to me that it was a pipe. 
Q What did you do then? 
A I retrieved it out of his pocket. 
Q What did you notice about the pipe? 
A That it had been used, 
Q For what? 
A Marijuana. 
Q You can say that because of your training and 
experience in relation to marijuana? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you look in his shoes? 
A I did. 
Q What did you find in his shoes? 
A I found another — something rolled up, but it wasnft 
visible as far as like automatically seeing it as a pipe. It 
was concealed in something. 
Q What did it turn out to be? Did you look at that? 
A I did not. I just gave — I think I gave it to 
Officer Robertson. 
MR. PROBERT: No further questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. GOWANS: 
Q Officer Rockwood, when exactly did you arrive on this 
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case? 
A I was working swing shift that evening, so I just got 
off at 1 o'clock in Orem, so I might have got there — I donft 
know how long the stop had been going on. I would guess five 
or eight minutes into the stop. I don't exactly recall the 
specific time or how long he had been there. 
Q When you arrived, Officer Bartell had already 
retrieved all of the knives; is that correct? 
A He was in the process of doing that. 
Q Did you search the passengers because Officer 
Robertson told you to do that? 
A Because of the knives I think it became a concern of 
all of ours. 
Q The question is, did you search because Officer 
Robertson told you to do that? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q If Officer Robertson testified at a previous hearing 
that officer safety was not an issue at that time, would you 
agree with him? 
A I don't know. I wasn't at the trial. I don't know 
what he said at the previous trial. 
Q Let me tell you that that's what he said. Do you 
agree with that statement that it wasn't an issue at the time 
of the search? 
MR. PROBERT: Defense counsel is testifying. 
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THE COURT: State your question. You know, I have a 
transcript here. You can point to it and read it or whatever. 
Itf s here in the file. 
Q (By Ms. Gowans) Did you search the passengers under 
Officer Robertson's direction? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q So, you basically did that based on the concerns that 
Officer Robertson had; is that correct? 
A I was back-up officer. It was his stop, so he was 
the lead guy. 
Q Hefs the one who said, "Go and search these 
passengers"? 
A Yes. 
Q He had you search the passengers because the K-9 -unit 
indicated on the exterior of the vehicle, correct? 
A Yes. 
MS. GOWANS: That's all the questions I have. Thank 
you? 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. PROBERT: Yes, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PROBERT: 
Q Do you know how many knives had been taken out of the 
vehicle before you took Mr. Baker out of the vehicle? 
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A Like I said, there were more than five. Not just — 
glancing at the hood, there were quite a few. 
Q Do you know if there continued to be knives taken out 
of the vehicle while Mr. Baker was out of the vehicle with 
you? 
A I don*t recall that, no, I don't. 
MR. PROBERT: Thank you. 
MS. GOWANS: I have a couple. 
RECROSSHEXAMINATION 
BY MS GOWANS: 
Q Do you recall the size of the knives that you saw on 
the hood of the vehicle? 
A They ranged from pocket knives up to large knives. 
When I say "large," a blade 5, 6 inches long, as I recall. 
Q Were you aware that those were voluntarily handed 
over to Officer Bartell by the passengers? 
A I understood they voluntarily gave them up, yeah. 
Q Did any of the passengers threaten you at any time? 
A No. 
Q Are you aware of whether any of them were violent at 
all? 
A Not aware of that. 
Q So, is it fair to say that you weren't concern for 
officer safety at that point? 
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A That's a hard question to answer because on any 
traffic stop a police officer is always aware of officer 
safety, even if no knives are found. 
Q There was nothing about these passengers, anything 
that they did or said to you, that made you fear for your 
safety; is that a fair statement? 
A No, not totally because I think any police officer 
when they get that relaxed then they're going to get hurt. 
Q If I can just restate what you're saying. On any 
traffic stop you feel that safety is an issue, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q But there was nothing about this particular traffic 
stop, as far as anything that the passengers said or did or 
anything you knew about their histories or anything of that 
nature, that made you fear for your safety; is that a fair 
statement? 
MR. PROBERT: Objection, Your Honor, asked and 
answered. 
THE COURT: Has it been asked and answered? He said 
he's always aware of officer safety. 
MS. GOWANS: But that wasn't the question. 
THE COURT: What's the question? 
Q (By Ms. Gowans) The question is, as far as this 
individual stop is concerned, was there anything about these 
passengers that they said that they did or anything of that 
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nature, anything you knew about their histories that would 
lead you — 
A Other than seeing the knives? 
Q Right. 
A No. 
MS.GOWANS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. 
MR. PROBERT: The State calls Officer Robertson. 
THE COURT: Come forward and be sworn. 
MR. PROBERT: Your Honor, may Officer Rockwood be 
excused? 
THE COURT: Any objection, Counsel? 
MS. COWANS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
RAYMOND ROBERTSON, 
Called by the State, having been duly 
Sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Be seated and respond to questions from 
counsel. 
MS. GOWRNS: Your Honor, I do have just one quick 
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question, kind of a housekeeping matter. Officer Robertson 
testified at preliminary hearing extensively on the very 
issues we're talking about today. So is he going to bring in 
new testimony based on that stop? 
THE COURT: I don't know. I have no idea. 
MR. PROBERT: I've actually told Ms. Gowans about the 
evidence I'm going to give Officer Robertson previously, Your 
Honor. 
MS. GOWANS: What my understanding from the State is 
that Officer Rockwood was going to testify. I don't know what 
information we need from Officer Robertson. I guess that's my 
question. Is there additional — 
THE COURT: Listen to the questions and have counsel 
examine Officer Robertson. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PROBERT: 
Q Officer Robertson, would you state your name for the 
record, please, and spell your last name. 
A Raymond Robertson, R-0~B-E-R-T-S-0-N. 
Q You previously testified in these proceedings that 
you are an officer with the Pleasant Grove Police Department 
and you stopped a vehicle containing the defendant as a 
passenger on the 30th of September 2004, correct? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
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Q When approaching the vehicle that you stopped, how 
many occupants were in the vehicle? 
A A total of five. 
Q This was in the evening, wasn't it? 
A That's correct. 
Q Due to the number of occupants, how did you check the 
number of occupants and the inside of the vehicle? 
A When I initially approached the vehicle, I used a 
flashlight to survey the back passengers first before I 
approached the driver. 
Q Did you then approach the driver? 
A I did, yes. 
Q You had a conversation with her? 
A I did. 
Q When you returned to your vehicle, did you run a 
license or warrant check on the driver? 
A I did. 
Q You received information about her. What was that 
information? 
A That the driver had a suspended driverT s license. 
Q What agency did you contact to send a K-9 unit to the 
scene? 
A I asked my dispatch if they would contact either Orem 
or American Fork, which both have K-9, and they contacted Orem 
first and Orem said they would respond. 
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Q How long after you asked for the K-9 did the K-9 
appear? 
A I would have to refer back to my report which I don't 
have. It's on the desk over here. 
MR. PROBERT: May I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
THE WITNESS: I requested a K-9 at 021:00 hours. 
Orem told our dispatch they would respond at 022:00 hours and 
Officer Lopez arrived at 01:34 hours. 
Q (By Mr. Probert) You then dealt with the driver. I 
think you testified that you placed her under arrest for 
driving on suspension. Did you then search her? 
A I did. 
Q What did you find when you searched her? 
A There was a knife, I believe. 
Q By that time that you were searching her, had other 
knives been removed from the vehicle? 
A When I originally walked up to the car the first 
time, the initial approach, I noticed a knife on one of the 
rear passengers. And then after Officer Bartell arrived, I 
informed him that there was a knife with the rear passenger 
and he approached. 
Q Were you able to see him collecting knives out of the 
vehicle or were you not paying attention to what he was doing? 
MS. GOWANS: Your Honor, I would just object on the 
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basis that all of these questions were asked and answered at 
the preliminary hearing. 
THE COURT: The purpose of a preliminary hearing is 
to determine whether or not therefs probable cause that the 
offenses were committed and that the defendant committed the 
offenses. The purpose for this hearing goes to the issues as 
it relates to the challenge or the motion to suppress. 
MS. GOWANS: That correct, Your Honor. But we did 
address these issues in the preliminary hearing with the 
intent to file the motion to suppress, which is why they were 
brought up. I mean, if the Court wants to waste its time 
listening to the same answers and the same questions, that's 
fine, but this has all been asked and answered before. 
MR. PROBERT: Your Honor, I can respond to that. The 
questions Ifm asking are questions Ms. Gowans specifically 
objected to in my memoranda because they were matters not 
before the Court in a preliminary hearing transcript. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MS. GOWANS: Not these questions. 
Q (By Mr. Probert) How many knives were in the vehicle 
all together? 
A My report indicates a total of 13 knives were taken. 
Q You told Ms. Gowans at the preliminary hearing that 
you believe those 13 knives had been taken out of the vehicle 
before Mr. Baker was taken out of the vehicle; is that 
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correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that actually what happened? 
A Yes. 
Q After the K-9 sniff, you asked Officer Rockwood to 
examine people in the vehicle; is that correct? 
A I asked him to assist on the search of the vehicle. 
Q What did you say to him about your concerns in 
relation to the vehicle, anything? 
A I donTt remember specifically anything. I think we 
discussed the amount of knives that were found while we were 
waiting for K-9. 
Q The knives were all taken out of the vehicle before 
K-9 arrived? 
MS. GOWANS: Asked and answered. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Probert) Did you receive something from 
Officer Rockwood that he had found in the defendant's shoe? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you find that to be? 
A Another glass pipe. 
MS. GOWANS: Your Honor, we don't dispute the 
evidence that was found on the defendant for purposes of this 
hearing. 
MR. PROBERT: I don't have any further questions, 






THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
GOWANS: 
Just a couple of questions to clarify, Officer 
son. You indicated at the preliminary hearing several 1 
that Mr. Baker and the other passengers were searched 











You also testified at that hearing that officer 
was not an issue or a concern as it relates to that 
, correct? 
I haven't read the transcript. I can!t remember the 
question then. 
Would you like me to show it to you? 
Sure. 
MS. GOWANS: If I could have a minute, Your Honor. 
(Pause in proceedings.) 
THE COURT: Yes, Counsel. 
MS. GOWANS: If I can approach. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. PROBERT: What are you showing him? 
MS. GOWANS: Oh, sorry, page 21 of the transcript. 
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(Witness reviews document.) 
Q (By Ms. Gowans) Did you just read where you 
testified that officer safety was not an issue at the time 
that Mr. Baker was searched? 
A I did say that, yes. 
Q You would agree with that now that that was not a 
concern and that that was not the reason for the search of 
Mr. Baker? 
A That was not — you're asking was that a concern or 
was it not? 
Q That was not the reason that you searched Mr. Bakerr 
correct? 
A To search for a weapon. 
Q You werenrt searching for a weapon when you had 
Mr. Baker searched, correct? You were searching for drugs or 
paraphernalia; is that a fair statement? 
A No, that's not a fair statement. 
Q Why not? 
A When we are searching as police officers, we are 
always going to search for anything that can harm us and for 
contraband. 
Q So when you decided to have Mr. Baker searched, what 
was your reason? 
A The reason for the search was, number one, the dog 
had indicated on the vehicle, so we are searching for the 
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contraband as indicated by the K-9. In that search as well 
we're still going to be concerned with weapons at all times. 
Q I'm not sure I'm understanding. You searched because 
you wanted to see if there was any drugs or contraband on 
Mr. Baker, right ? 
A Sure. 
Q Because the dog indicated on the vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q At that time you had no reason to fear for your 
safety; is that a fair statement? 
A No. 
Q Why is that not a fair statement? 
A Just like what Officer Rockwood testified to, we are 
always concerned about our safety. 
Q Okay. But there was nothing specific about the facts 
of this case that made you fear for your safety, correct? 
A Maybe I don't understand the question correctly. 
Q Are you just saying that generally every time you 
conduct a search, you do it because you fear for officer 
safety? 
A Yes, we have to. 
Q But in this particular case the reason that you 
decided to search Mr. Baker was not because you were afraid 
for your safety; is that a fair statement? 
A Yes, that's a fair statement. 
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Q The reason you did it was to search for drugs and 
contraband. 
A Yes. 
MS. GOWANS: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PROBERT: 
Q How often have you found knives in a vehicle? 
A That is a rare case. 
Q Who actually did the search of Mr. Baker? 
A Officer Rockwood. 
MR. PROBERT: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
MS. GOWANS: I donft have any further 
cross-examination. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you very much. 
Why donTt you return that to counsel. Anything further? 
MR. PROBERT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Submit it or argue it, what do you wish 
to do? 
MS. GOVIANS: Your Honor, I would submit it on our 
memorandum that we filed. I donTt think anything has changed 
as far as the material facts of this case. The officers 
testified consistently that there was nothing about the 
specific facts of this case that made them fear for their 
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safety. There was no violence or threats. 
The passengers voluntarily relinquished the knives. 
The officers didnft even know those knives were in the car, 
the one that the first passenger disclosed. But when they 
were asked, they all went ahead and turned over those knives. 
There was no reason even for them to have to do that because 
they shouldn!t have been detained. There was no reasonable 
suspicion at that point that any of them had been or were 
about to commit a crime. 
It's clear and clean that the reason for the search, 
the Terry frisk, if that's what they want to call it, was for 
contraband because the dog indicated on the exterior of the 
vehicle. As a matter of law, that doesn!t give probable cause 
to conduct a search of the passenger. Other than that, we 
would submit it on the additional arguments set forth in the 
memorandum that we filed. 
THE? COURT: Counsel. 
MR. PROBERT: Your Honor, there are two knives which 
is what was found at the first or 13 as it turns out that there 
were eventually. The State would argue that the more knives 
that come out of the vehicle, the more the officers would be 
concerned about their safety. Whether they articulate that or 
not, it's a reasonable officer approach. He viewed one knife 
in plain sight on one suspect, and he viewed another knife 
found subsequent to the arrest of the driver, and it was a 
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reasonable inference to assume that other knives or other 
weapons might be found on other passengers, notwithstanding 
that they produced 12 already. 
THE COURT: Ms. Gowans, anything further? 
MS. GOWANS: Just briefly, Your Honor. Just based on 
the facts of this case, first of all, these were, from what 
the offices testified to, in large part pocket knives and 
relatively small knives. They were all voluntarily 
relinquished. The passengers were all cooperative with the 
police right from the very beginning. There were no threats 
to their safety; no violence; no indication that any of these 
individuals had any type of violent history. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also indicated that the 
officers have to have a reasonable belief that a defendant is 
armed and dangerous in order to conduct a Terry frisk. On 
these facts, that would not be a reasonable belief that 
theyf re armed and dangerous. 
THE COURT: Why not? Isnft the testimony before the 
Court that this is a very rare case in the number of knives 
that have been produced at this stop? 
MS. GOWANS: Well, where are the fact that support 
that these individuals are dangerous? ThereTs no evidence 
that any of them have or were about to commit a crime. 
There!s no evidence to suggest that they would do anything to 
threaten or harm the officers. None of the officers testified 
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that anything that these individuals did made them feel any 
threat towards their safety. 
And, Your Honor, the bottom line is the officers 
testified that they searched because they were looking for 
drugs, not because they were looking for weapons. 
THE COURT: I thought Officer Robertson said they go 
hand in hand, actually. You donTt search exclusively as it 
relates to contraband without looking for weapons in terms of 
officer safety. I thought that's what Officer Rockwell also 
said. 
MS. GOWANS: What they are saying is any time in 
general when they conduct a traffic stop, whether itTs of Your 
Honor or Mr. Probert or myself or whomever, they have a 
reasonable fear for their safety just because of the nature of 
what they are doing; that that's always an issue. That's not 
enough to carry it as far as the U.S. Supreme Court is 
concerned. They can't conduct a Terry frisk on every traffic 
stop. They have to have a reasonable — 
THE COURT: No, but can you point to any other 
traffic stop in any case that has produced 13 knives? 
MS. GOWANS: Your Honor, the other question is 
what — the officer testified that he asked if that were any 
other knives in the vehicle and they went ahead and turned 
those over. What's the basis for that? 
THE COURT: You haven't challenged that. 
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MS. GOWMJS: That is something that we have discussed 
in the brief as far as the detention. There is nothing that 
gives rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion or probable 
cause to justify even asking for them to produce that, which 
they went ahead and voluntarily did anyway, which shows 
they're not armed and dangerous. There's nothing here on 
these facts to suggest that. And — 
THE COURT: I will rule in writing as it relates to 
the determination of facts and take it under advisement. 
MS. GOWRNS: Thank you. 
MR. PROBERT: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you both. 
(Proceedings in the above-entitled 
matter were concluded.) 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LUKE ZACHARY BAKER, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 041403985 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained 
by the State of Utah in the instant case. The Court having carefully considered the Motions and 
Memoranda and in response to counsels' request for a decision based solely on the pleadings, now 
makes the following Ruling and Order. 
L 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. The Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof on 
December 13, 2004. 
2. The State filed its Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on December 27, 2004. 
3. The Defendant filed its Reply to the State's Response on January 10, 2005. 
4. On February 9,2005, the Court held a Suppression Hearing, where testimony was presented 





The facts relied on herein were adduced from testimony at both the preliminary hearing and 
the suppression hearing. 
III. 
ANALYSIS & RULING 
1. Initial Detention 
First of all, police officers have considerable discretion to protect officer safety, including 
having passengers exit a vehicle while the traffic stop is being conducted. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 
U. S. 40 8,415 (1997). This can logically be extended to permitting officers to have passengers remain 
inside the vehicle during the stop. However, the litmus test for whether an individual has been 
detained "depends on when the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer 
thinks the person is no longer free to leave." State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655,659 (Utah App. 1996) 
(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, "the subjective intention of the [officer] is irrelevant except insofar as they may 
have been conveyed to the [defendant]." U.S. v. Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544, 554 n.6 (1980). Such 
a detention occurs when an "officer engages in conduct which a reasonable person would view as 
threatening or offensive even if performed by another private citizen." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 
P.2d 274, 278 (Utah App. 2000). Hence, it is an objective test that balances the totality of the 
circumstances that the alleged detainee is faced with. Finally, a canine sniff conducted during a 
concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that 
no individual has any right to possess, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes, 
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543 U.S. (2005) (Slip Opinion). 
Although the time line of this traffic stop is somewhat blurry, it appears that the stop was 
initiated very early in the morning on September 30, 2004, that the K-9 was requested at 1:21 a.m., 
that the K-9 arrived at 1:34 a.m., and the Defendant was searched and arrested at 1:45 a.m. The 
request for the K-9 coincided with the discovery that the driver's license had been suspended for 
drugs. Notably, the Defendant does not make any attenuation challenge to the actual time length of 
the stop or in connection with the K-9 request, etc. 
The K-9 arrived soon after the driver was placed under arrest in the police car; the significance 
of the K-9 is discussed infra. In sum, it was dark, extremely early in the morning, there were five 
occupants, two knives had already been found, and the officers were dealing with the driver and her 
arrest until the K-9 arrived. Furthermore, the officers never told the Defendant that he was not free 
to leave, although he testified that he subjectively believed that (which is irrelevant). Under these 
circumstances, the Defendant was not "detained" for purposes of Fourth Amendment protections to 
be triggered. 
2. Canine Sniff 
A positive alert by a police-trained drug-detecting canine "is sufficient to establish probable 
cause" to search. U.S. v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999). The only exception to this general 
rule seems to be if the dog has a poor accuracy record with a history of false alerts. U.S. v. Ludwig, 
10 F.3d 1523, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1993). Officers with probable cause may conduct a warrantless 
search of the passenger compartment of a car, including its occupants, pursuant to the automobile 
exception to the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); U.S. v. Barbee, 968 
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F.2d 1026,1030 (10th Cir. 1992). 
In this case, the facts are undisputed that the K-9 unit, which responded to the scene 13 
minutes after it was called, alerted to the exterior of the vehicle that the Defendant was traveling in. 
Ironically, Defense Counsel argued at the Suppression Hearing that the canine sniff is legally 
insufficient to establishing probable cause. This flies in the face of the aforementioned well-
established case law, which holds the contrary position. Because the case law is clear and because 
the Defendant has failed to challenge the canine's accuracy record, the Court finds that the Defendant 
was properly searched incident to the probable cause derived from the positive canine alert. 
3. Terry Frisk - Police Safety 
The "danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers 
in addition to the driver in the stopped car." Maryland, 519 U.S. at 414. Furthermore, "[w]here a 
police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes 
that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a 'frisk' or 'pat-down' 
search of the individual to discover weapons that might be used against him." State v. Lafond, 68 
P.3d 1043,1049 (Utah App. 2003) (citing State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985)) (emphasis 
added); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). An officer's reasonable belief that an individual 
may be armed and dangerous is not necessarily assuaged by the Defendant's assurances. In State v. 
McLean, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that the officer "was not required to take the word of the 
driver that the weapons were unloaded, nor did he have to wait for a passenger to make a threatening 
move before he checked the weapons to assure his own safety." Id., 1999 UT App. 114 ("not for 
official publication"). 
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Officer Mike Bartell, who retrieved the knives, testified that he recovered about 12 knives 
from the passengers, including a set of throwing knives. Officer Chris Lavar Rockwood, who arrived 
to assist Officer Raymond Robertson, conducted the Terry frisk of the Defendant. Before conducting 
the frisk, Officer Rockwood had observed "quite a few," "more than five" knives that had been taken 
from the vehicle and that they "ranged [in size] from pocket knives to large knives." He also admitted 
that while there had been no overt threats from the passengers, he still had a concern for officer safety 
after observing the large number of knives. 
In addition, Officer Robertson testified that it was a rare case to retrieve 12-13 knives from 
a vehicle. The sheer number of knives alerted the officers that it was reasonable to conclude that 
there might be other weapons. Officer Robertson testified that he is always concerned about officer 
safety, though he personally had no fear at this scene for his own safety. Furthermore, the Court 
emphasizes that it was dark, around 1:30 a.m., and there were a total of five occupants in the vehicle. 
In sum, the Terry frisk of the Defendant did not occur until after: 
a. The driver had been placed under arrest, 
b. 12-13 knives had been retrieved from the passengers and driver, including some large 
knives, 
c. A police-trained drug-detection canine alerted to the trunk and the rear door of the 
vehicle. The Court also notes that the Defendant was a passenger in the rear seat at 
the time. 
In light of these facts, frankly, it could not be much more clear that the officers reasonably 
believed that the Defendant and the other passengers were armed and dangerous. When the police 
initially approached the vehicle, they noted that one of the occupants in the back seat was armed with 
5 
0070 
a large knife. Additionally, when the driver was searched incident to arrest for driving on a 
suspended license, another knife was found on her. After the officers requested that the passengers 
turn over any other knives they had on them, a total of 13 knives were recovered, including at least 
one from the Defendant. The Defendant argues that after these additional knives were "voluntarily" 
produced, the police no longer had a reasonable belief that the Defendant was armed or dangerous. 
However, this Court finds that such an argument fails to have any merit in the context of this traffic 
stop. As a result, the officers conducted a proper Terry frisk of the Defendant. 
IV. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 
Signed this / / - day of February, 2005. ^ \ * T ^ V 
ffon^rable Lynn Ws Davis ? « v 
Fourth District Court Judged *£jf> 
I) 
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3301 North University Ave. 
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*1 Defendant James Philip McLean was charged 
with Possession of a Controlled Substance 
(Methamphetamine), a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (1996 & Supp.1997). After his 
motion to suppress evidence was denied, defendant 
pleaded no contest on the condition he could appeal 
the trial court's ruling. He now claims the trial court 
erred by finding that the traffic stop that produced 
the incriminating evidence was justified and that the 
scope of the resulting detention was reasonably 
related to the circumstances surrounding the stop. 
We affirm. 
We "review the factual findings underlying a trial 
court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a 
clearly erroneous standard," and "consider the facts 
in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination." State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 
657 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citations omitted). "Clear 
error will be found only when the trial court's 
factual findings run against the clear weight of the 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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evidence." Id. Nevertheless, we "review the trial 
court's legal conclusions based on [its factual 
determinations] 'for correctness according no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions.' " Id. 
(quoting State v. Yates, 918 P .2d 136, 138 (Utah 
Ct.App.1996)). 
" 'Although a person has a lesser expectation of 
privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does 
not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
while in an automobile.' " State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Schlosser, 
714 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citation 
omitted)). Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment's 
ban against unreasonable searches and seizures 
applies to traffic stops, regardless of how brief the 
stop or for what reason it is made. See Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396 
(1979). 
Only unreasonable searches and seizures, however, 
receive Fourth Amendment protection, see Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873 (1968), 
and we review the reasonableness of brief 
investigatory stops, such as traffic stops, under a 
two-part test. First, a police officer's action must be 
" 'justified at its inception,' " and second, the 
resulting detention must be " 'reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place.' " Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
1131-32 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 
at 1879). 
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in 
finding the traffic stop was justified based on 
Deputy Owen Shiverdecker's testimony that he 
witnessed an equipment failure. After reviewing the 
record, we are unpersuaded that the trial court's 
finding that the traffic stop was justified was clearly 
erroneous. The mechanic's testimony does not help 
defendant because it only established that the rear 
license plate bulb was operable one month after the 
traffic stop. Likewise, testimony that the bulb was 
working shortly after the stop still does not refute 
itoOrig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Shiverdecker's testimony that he believed he saw an 
equipment failure as he passed defendant's vehicle. 
Accordingly, we will not supplant the trial court's 
finding on this matter with our own evaluation. See 
State v. Archuleta, 925 P.2d 1275, 1276-77 n. 1 
(Utah Ct.App. 1996). 
*2 We next address whether the scope of the 
resulting detention was reasonably related to the 
original circumstances justifying the traffic stop. " 
When a stop is made, the detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. O'Brien, 
959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (citations 
omitted). During a routine traffic stop, an officer 
may detain the driver to check the driver's license 
and vehicle registration, and issue a citation. See id. 
Defendant contends that Shiverdecker 
unconstitutionally detained him because the officer 
had no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity once the driver told Shiverdecker unloaded 
guns were in the car. Defendant maintains this gave 
Shiverdecker no right to extend the scope of the 
traffic stop to check those weapons. Defendant also 
challenges the trial court's finding that Shiverdecker 
feared for his safety, thus justifying the weapons 
check. Defendant argues that because the record 
does not show Shiverdecker had legitimate safety 
concerns, no evidence supports a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.FN1 
FN1. The State points out that this is not 
necessarily true. Shiverdecker, upon 
hearing the defendant proclaim that 
multiple weapons were in the vehicle, " 
moved back behind the rear seat passenger 
to be a little more secure, and asked that 
[the occupants] hand the guns out by the 
barrels just so [he] could make sure they 
were unloaded." 
Courts, however, have given broad discretion to 
police officers who are concerned for their safety 
while detaining suspects. "So long as the officer is 
entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to 
believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he 
may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to 
[protect his safety]." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923 (1972) (footnote 
omitted); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481 (1983) (holding 
officer may conduct weapons search if officer 
reasonably believes "suspect is dangerous and the 
suspect may gain immediate control of weapons"). 
This is not the first time we have encountered 
circumstances such as these. This court recently 
ruled that an officer did not exceed the scope of a 
traffic stop by conducting a weapons search after he 
learned the defendant had a weapon in the vehicle. 
See O'Brien, 959 P.2d at 649. The officer in that 
case was justified in suspending his original 
investigation of an equipment failure to first guard 
his safety. See id (citing Adams, 407 U.S. at 148, 
92 S.Ct. at 1924). 
Indeed, we have rejected the notion that an officer 
must convince the court he was certain of criminal 
activity on the part of a defendant in order to 
conduct a warrantless search for weapons during a 
traffic stop. See State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 
870-71 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). We reasoned in 
Bradford that "[t]he proper standard is objective, 
requiring only that a reasonably prudent person in 
the police officer's circumstances would believe his 
or her safety was threatened." Id. (citing State v. 
Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah 1983)). 
In light of the circumstances surrounding the traffic 
stop in this case, we conclude the trial court did not 
clearly err in finding Shiverdecker acted reasonably 
by detaining defendant to check the weapons. 
Shiverdecker stopped the vehicle at approximately 
4:10 a.m. on a small, unlit highway near the Jordan 
River. He was alone and had not called for backup. 
The vehicle contained four unknown individuals. 
Shiverdecker also noticed several guns in plain 
view inside the vehicle within immediate reach of 
the passengers and driver. FN2 
FN2. Defendant does not contest the fact 
that the weapons or the pipe were in plain 
view, nor does he challenge that 
Shiverdecker had probable cause to search 
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and arrest defendant. 
*3 At minimum, Shiverdecker was justified in 
suspending his original investigation to detain 
defendant until Shiverdecker could assure his own 
safety. See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 
(Utah 1996); O'Brien, 959 P.2d at 649; see also 
Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1425 (10th 
Cir.1997). He was not required to take the word of 
the driver that the weapons were unloaded, nor did 
he have to wait for a passenger to make a 
threatening move before he checked the weapons to 
assure his own safety. We therefore affirm the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
WILKINS, P.J., and BILLINGS, J., concur. 
Utah App., 1999. 
State v. McLean 
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